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This article suggests an alternative way of thinking about the role
of law at the time of divorce. It is concerned primarily with the
impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargaining that oc-
cur outside the courtroom. We see the primary function of contem-
porary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather
as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can them-
selves determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities. This
process by which parties to a marriage are empowered to create their
own legally enforceable commitments is a form of "private ordering."'
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1. Professors Hart and Sacks have written:
Every society necessarily assigns many kinds of questions to private decision, and then
backs up the private decision, if it has been duly made, when and if it is challenged
before officials. Thus, private persons are empowered, by observance of a prescribed
procedure, to oblige themselves to carry out certain contractual undertakings, and, if
dispute arises, to settle their differences for themselves. So may a host of other
matters be settled which are immediately of private, but potentially of public, con-
cern. In a genuine sense, these procedures of private decision, too, become institu-
tionalized. An understanding of how they work is vital to an understanding of the
institutional system as a whole.
H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application
of Law 7 (tent. ed. 1958). A definition of private ordering attributed to Professor Fuller
is "law" that parties bring into existence by agreement. On the continuity between the
social processes of negotiation and adjudication, see Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1976).
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Available evidence concerning how divorce proceedings actually
work suggests that a reexamination from the perspective of private
ordering is timely. "Typically, the parties do not go to court at all,
until they have worked matters out and are ready for the rubber
stamp."' 2 Both in the United States and in England, the overwhelm-
ing majority of divorcing couples resolve distributional questions
concerning marital property, alimony, child support, and custody
without bringing any contested issue to court for adjudication.
3
This new perspective and the use of the term "private ordering"
are not meant to suggest an absence of important social interests in
how the process works or in the fairness of its outcomes. The implicit
policy questions are ones of emphasis and degree: to what extent
should the law permit and encourage divorcing couples to work out
their own arrangements? Within what limits should parties be em-
powered to make their own law by private agreement? What pro-
cedural or substantive safeguards are necessary to protect various
social interests?
Nor is this perspective meant to imply that law and the legal sys-
tem are unimportant. To divorcing spouses and their children, fam-
ily law is inescapably relevant. The legal system affects when a divorce
may occur, how a divorce must be procured, and what the conse-
quences of divorce will be. Our primary purpose is to develop a
framework within which to consider how the rules and procedures
used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process
that occurs between divorcing couples outside the courtroom.
4
2. Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito
Counties, 10 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 267, 270 (1976). Friedman and Percival indicate that, in
1970, family law cases (primarily divorce and annulment) made up a high percentage of
the civil caseloads in the trial courts of Alameda (51.7%) and San Benito (61.7%) Counties,
California. See id. at 281-82. They conclude that in the vast majority of these family
cases, as in other areas, the courts performed "routine administration" rather than dispute
settlement through adjudication. Id. at 296. A study of divorce proceedings in Maryland
nearly 50 years ago concluded, similarly, that extremely few cases involve an actual con-
flict; most are "formal contests waged simply to satisfy the demands of the judicial forms."
1 L. MARSHALL & G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT 199 (1932); see 2 id. at 292 (1933) (Ohio)
(four-fifths of divorce cases uncontested and "usually require but a few minutes" of court
time).
3. Although there are no data that permit reliable estimates on a national basis, avail-
able estimates are that only a very small percentage of divorces-probably less than 10%-
involve disputes that are contested in court. See M. HUNT, THE WORLD OF THE FORMERLY
MARRIED 227 (1966); Galanter, Vhy the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y Rav. 95, 108 (1974). An English study found that
custody or visitation was contested at a court hearing in only 6.9% of the cases involving
minor children. J. Eekelaar & E. Clive, Custody After Divorce 66 (Family Law Studies No.
1, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford 1977).
4. In addition to affecting couples' bargaining behavior at the time of dissolution,
divorce law may also influence a broad range of prior family decisions-e.g., when,
whether, and whom to marry; the number, timing, and spacing of children; the allocation
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In this article we first examine the degree to which the law today
authorizes private ordering at the time of divorce: to what extent
can divorcing spouses create their own legally enforceable commit-
ments? In this context, we will also explain why we think the legal
system should provide divorcing couples broad power to resolve the
various questions that arise. Second, we develop a simple bargaining
model to suggest how the legal system affects negotiations between
spouses and their representatives at the time of divorce. Finally, we
apply this framework to several issues that have dominated much of
the academic discussion concerning family law during recent years:
(1) the advantages and disadvantages of discretion-conferring legal
standards for child custody; (2) Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's pro-
posed visitation standard; (3) the role of lawyers in the divorce
process; and (4) the role of courts in "undisputed" divorces.
I. Private Ordering in Divorce
A. Existing Limits on Private Ordering
A legal system might allow varying degrees of private ordering
upon dissolution of the marriage.5 Until recently, divorce law at-
of resources during marriage; and whether and when to divorce. These effects, however,
seem more speculative and remote. Many believe that people decide to marry and raise
children without any consideration of the legal standards governing divorce dispositions.
At any rate, given the present state of knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, con-
cerning the effects of legal rules on behavior, this article does not attempt to trace out
more general, longrun effects. An interesting comparison might be made with the growing
discussion of the effect of economics on family decisions in, for example, ECONOMICS OF
THE FAMILY (T. Schultz ed. 1974).
5. The fact that a continuum exists can best be seen if one considers two extremes. At
one extreme would be a society that prohibited married couples from determining for
themselves the circumstances that permit divorce. The restriction could take the form of
an absolute prohibition on divorce, or it might require an inquiry by a state official to
determine whether narrowly defined "grounds" for divorce had been met. After a divorce,
the state might assert a continuing regulatory power over child care and over transfers of
resources between the spouses. At the opposite extreme would be a society that allowed a
substantial degree of private ordering. Cf. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)
(discussing minimalist, "night-watchman" state). Marriage could be dissolved at the
request of either spouse. A divorcing couple would then be free to make any mutually
agreeable deal governing the division of their property, their respective child-rearing
responsibilities, and their future economic claims on each other. The state would provide
a court system to enforce this deal and to resolve any subsequent disputes. The state
would also stand ready to impose a division of the couple's resources and responsibilities;
but only if the spouses themselves were unable to reach a mutually acceptable bargain.
Between these two extremes lie a variety of intermediate measures by which the state
can control or influence the process of dissolution. These measures can have varying
degrees of intrusiveness on the power of the parties to strike their own bargain. For
example, certain promises-e.g., never to request child support-might be made unen-
forceable. Certain minimum conditions-e.g., that each spouse receive a certain minimum
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tempted to restrict private ordering severely. Divorce was granted
only after an official inquiry by a judge, who had to determine
whether "appropriate grounds"-very narrowly defined in terms of
marital offenses-existed. 6 When a divorce was granted, the state as-
serted broad authority to structure the economic relationship of the
spouses and to maintain regulatory jurisdiction over the children
and their relationship to the parents. 7 Doctrines such as collusion,8
connivance,9 and condonation' were meant to curtail the degree to
which parties themselves could bring about a divorce through agree-
ment; the procedural requirements reflected the view that everyone
was "a suspicious character."" Obviously, the marital-offense regime
could not, even at its most restrictive, eliminate collusion entirely.
Some divorcing spouses worked things out for themselves and then
(with their lawyers' help) staged a carefully rehearsed and jointly
produced play for the court. 12 Nevertheless, the legal system was
structured to minimize private ordering.
Dramatic changes in divorce law during the past decade now per-
mit a substantial degree of private ordering. The "no-fault revolu-
tion"' 3 has made divorce largely a matter of private concern. Parties
percentage of joint assets-might be required in any division of property. Or the state
might require the parties to follow specified procedures-e.g., putting separation agree-
ments in writing, obtaining prior official review, or observing a minimum waiting period.
6. See H. CLARK, Doamsric RELATIONS 327-57 (1968) (describing grounds for divorce in
marital-offense or fault-based regime). See generally H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRI-
MONIAL CASES (1963) (New York case study); M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE,
AND THE LAW 28-50 (1972) (comparing liberal and conservative divorce laws); Note, The
Administration of Divorce: A Philadelphia Study, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1204 (1953).
7. See generally Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and
Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CoN' EMP. PROB. 197, 201-11 (1939). Courts still
retain broad power to determine the consequences of divorce with respect to child sup-
port and custody.
8. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (party may reopen default
judgment of divorce on ground that it was collusively obtained); Churchward v. Church-
ward, [1895] 64 L.J.P. (n.s.) 18 (1894); Puxon, Collusion (pts. 1-2), 103 SOL. J. 686, 705 (1959).
9. See, e.g., Note, A Survey of the Law of Condonation, Connivance and Collusion in
New England, 35 B.U. L. REv. 99 (1955); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 342, 344 (1951) ("if one
spouse corruptly consents to adultery committed by the other, he is not entitled to a
divorce for that adultery"); Note, Connivance (series), 95 SOL. J. 147, 829 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Seiferth v. Seiferth, 132 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Tarr v.
Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 447, 35 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1945) (voluntary cohabitation after knowledge
of act of adultery is conclusive defense against divorce on that ground); Willan v. Willan,
[1960] 2 All E.R. 463 (C.A.).
11. R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTIcE IN ENGLAND 55 (6th ed. 1972).
12. For a discussion of collusive divorces under the marital-offense regime, and the
problems created for lawyers in that legal system, see 0. MCGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND
134-36 (1957); H. O'GORMAN, supra note 6, at 20-35.
13. See generally M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE (1974) (discussing no-fault move-
ment in United States). According to a recent survey, only three jurisdictions-Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota-retain only fault grounds for divorce. Freed & Foster,
Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAm. L.Q. 297, 298 (1977).
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to a marriage can now explicitly create circumstances that will allow
divorce. Indeed, agreement between spouses is not necessary in most
states; either spouse can unilaterally create the grounds for dissolu-
tion simply by separation for a sufficient period of time.
14
The parties' power to determine the consequences of divorce de-
pends on the presence of children. When the divorcing couple has
no children, the law generally recognizes the power of the parties
upon separation or divorce to make their own arrangements concern-
ing marital property and alimony. 15 A spousal agreement may be
subject to some sort of judicial proceeding-or, in England, submis-
sion to a Registrar-but on both sides of the Atlantic the official
review appears to be largely perfunctory.' 6 In some American states
a couple may make its agreement binding and final-i.e., not subject
to later modification by a court.'
7
In families with minor children, existing law imposes substantial
doctrinal constraints. For those allocational decisions that directly
affect children-that is, child support, custody, and visitation-parents
lack the formal power to make their own law. Judges, exercising
14. In 31 states divorce may be granted on the basis of an "irretrievable breakdown."
Freed & Foster, supra note 13, at 300. By moving out and consistently expressing an un-
willingness to move back one spouse can, as a practical matter, produce an "irretrievable
breakdown" even if the other spouse objects to a divorce. Twenty-one states permit
divorce on the basis of separation for a specified period of time. Id. at 302.
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-51(a), -66 (1979) (court shall enter decree when
parties, not attorneys, execute written stipulation that irretrievable breakdown of marriage
has occurred, appear in court, and submit agreement concerning alimony, property, and
rights and obligations as to children, if any; agreement shall be incorporated into decree
if, upon inquiry, court finds agreement fair and equitable); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DivoRcE AcT § 306 (adopted in five jurisdictions) (upon divorce, written separation agree-
ment by parties concerning property will be set forth in decree of dissolution unless court
finds agreement "unconscionable").
16. See C. FooTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 904
(2d ed. 1976) ("Only rarely do the courts interfere with the agreement worked out by
the parties."); W. Baker, J. Eekelaar, C. Gibson & S. Raikes, The Matrimonial Jurisdiction
of Registrars 58 (Family Law Studies No. 2, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson
College, Oxford 1977) (empirical study reporting that in England "it is the practice in
consent applications not to require any information in addition to that presented to the
court, even if the file contains no information at all") [hereinafter cited as Registrars
Study]; id. at 59 (commonly registrar "would investigate only if something was obviously
wrong," at least when no children were involved). Appellate courts, however, sometimes
urge more intensive review. See Monroe v. Monroe, 40 Conn. L.J. 14, 17 (Sup. Ct. Mar.
27, 1979) (criticizing trial referee's failure "to ascertain the parties' actual consent to the
proposal before him. Because of the emotionally-laden circumstances under which negotia-
tions about marital dissolutions necessarily take place, reasonable inquiries should be
made to ensure . . . that reasonable settlements have been knowingly agreed upon.")
(footnote omitted).
17. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4811(b) (West Supp. 1979) (alimony); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 46b-51(a), -66, -86 (1979) (alimony and property); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr
§ 306(f) (adopted in 5 jurisdictions) (property).
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the state's parens patriae power, are said to have responsibility to
determine who should have custody and on what conditions.' 8 Pri-
vate agreements concerning these matters are possible and common,
but agreements cannot bind the court,19 which, as a matter of official
dogma, is said to have an independent responsibility for determining
what arrangement best serves the child's welfare.20 Thus, the court
has the power to reject a parental agreement and order some other
level of child support or some other custodial arrangement it believes
to be more desirable. Moreover, even if the parties' initial agree-
ment is accepted by the court, it lacks finality. A court may at any
time during the child's minority reopen and modify the initial
decree in light of any subsequent change in circumstances. 21 The
parties entirely lack the power to deprive the court of this jurisdiction.
On the other hand, available evidence on how the legal system
processes undisputed divorce cases involving minor children suggests
that parents actually have broad powers to make their own deals.
Typically, separation agreements are rubber stamped even in cases
involving children. A study of custody in England suggests, for ex-
ample, that courts rarely set aside an arrangement acceptable to
the parents. 22 Anecdotal evidence in America suggests that the same
is true here.
23
The parents' broad discretion is not surprising for several reasons.
First, getting information is difficult when there is no dispute. The
state usually has very limited resources for a thorough and indepen-
dent investigation of the family's circumstances. Furthermore, par-
ents may be unwilling to provide damaging information that may
upset their agreed arrangements. Second, the applicable legal stan-
dards are extremely vague and give judges very little guidance as
18. See, e.g., Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala. App. 620, 623, 311 So. 2d 444, 447 (1975); Sheets
v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 178, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (1964).
19. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aar § 306(f) (enacted in five jurisdictions).
20. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 130 Cal. App. 2d 186, 193, 278 P.2d 441, 445 (1955)
(parental contract as to custody is "binding upon them," but cannot interfere with "that
wide discretionary power given to courts in the disposition of the custody of children, in
accord with their best interests, or independently of the desire of a parent"); Kritzik v.
Kritzik, 21 Wis. 2d 442, 448, 124 N.V.2d 581, 585 (1963).
21. See H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 498-99, 598-99 (child support and custody); R.
MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 197 (1978) (child support).
22. The study found that, in uncontested divorce cases involving children, the court
adjourned for further information or negotiation in less than 10% of cases; that a
welfare report was available in only 8.2% of uncontested cases; and that the courts
changed the child's residence in only 0.6% of uncontested cases. J. Eekelaar & E. Clive,
supra note 3, at 65-66.
23. See J. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 189 (1953) (ABA report in 1948 that 85% of
divorced parents reach agreement on custody); Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children
in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAm. L. 1, 2 (1966) (90%).
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to what circumstances justify overriding a parental decision.2 4 Fi-
nally, there are obvious limitations on a court's practical power to
control the parents once they leave the courtroom. For all these
reasons, it is not surprising that most courts behave as if their func-
tion in the divorce process is dispute settlement, not child protec-
tion.2 5 When there is no dispute, busy judges or registrars are typi-
cally quite willing to rubber stamp a private agreement, in order to
conserve resources for disputed cases.
2 6
B. The Advantages of Private Ordering
Before proceeding further, we should make clear the reasons why
we think the law should give divorcing spouses broad powers to make
their own agreement. There are obvious and substantial savings when
a couple can resolve distributional consequences of divorce without
resort to courtroom adjudication. The financial cost of litigation,
both private and public, is minimized. The pain of a formal adver-
sary proceeding is avoided. Recent psychological studies indicate
that children benefit when parents agree on custodial arrangements.
27
Moreover, a negotiated agreement allows the parties to avoid the
risks and uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing
consequences. Given the substantial delays that often characterize
contested judicial proceedings, 2s agreement can often save time and
allow each spouse to proceed with his or her life. Finally, a consensual
solution is by definition more likely to be consistent with the pref-
24. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 423 (1964);
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226, 249-54; Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study
of Vague and Indeterminate Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21, 23-25 (1965).
25. See Mnookin, supra note 24, at 229 (in custody, dispute settlement involves
"[choosing] between two or more private individuals, each of whom claims an associational
interest with the child"; child protection "involves the judicial enforcement of standards
of parental behavior believed necessary to protect the child").
26. R. MNOOKIN, supra note 21, at 628. A study of Connecticut courts revealed that the
average amount of time for a court hearing on an uncontested divorce was four minutes.
Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 104, 127 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pro Se Divorce].
27. See Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1131-32 & nn.19-24 (1978)
(citing sources) [hereinafter cited as Lawyering for the Child].
28. In Connecticut and New Jersey, for example, an uncontested divorce case can be
immediately scheduled for hearing as soon as statutory waiting periods have passed and
processing by the court administrators has been completed. Contested cases, however,
generally wait at least a year from the time the parties are ready until a trial date can
be scheduled. Telephone Interview with Hon. Robert Berdon, Judge, Connecticut Superior
Court (Mar. 28, 1979); Telephone Interview with Hon. Harvey R. Sorkow, Presiding
Judge, Matrimonial Division (temporarily assigned), Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen
County (Mar. 28, 1979) (Bergen County only).
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erences of each spouse, and acceptable over time, than would a result
imposed by a court.
In divorces that involve no minor children, divorcing couples
should have very broad powers to make their own arrangements;
significant limitations are inconsistent with the premises of no-fault
divorce. After all, who can better evaluate the comparative advan-
tages of alternative arrangements than the parties themselves?2 9 Courts
should not, of course, enforce agreements that reflect fraud or over-
reaching. Nor do we wish to minimize the importance of appropriate
standards for alimony and marital property, for, as will be discussed,
these standards very much affect negotiated outcomes.30 Nonetheless,
against a backdrop of fair standards, parties should be encouraged
to settle these economic issues for themselves. The state should pro-
vide an efficient and fair mechanism for enforcing such agreements
and for settling disputes when the parties are unable to agree.
When there are minor children, the state obviously has broader
interests than simple dispute settlement. The state also has a re-
sponsibility for child protection.31 To acknowledge this responsibility,
however, is not to define its limits. Indeed, the critical questions
concern the proper scope of the child-protection function at the time
of divorce and the mechanisms that best perform this function.
For reasons one of us has spelled out at length elsewhere, the actual
determination of what is in fact in a child's best interest is ordinarily
quite indeterminate. 32 It requires predictions beyond the capacity
of the behavioral sciences33 and involves imposition of values about
which there is little consensus in our society.34 Thus, the fundamental
question is: who gets to decide on behalf of the child? To what
extent should the child's parents be given the freedom to decide
between themselves how responsibility for their children is to be
allocated following divorce?
We believe divorcing parents should be given considerable freedom
to decide custody matters-subject only to the same minimum standards
for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the state imposes
on all families. A negotiated resolution is desirable from the child's
29. Each spouse, in the words of John Stuart Mill, "is the person most interested in
his own well-being: . . . with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most
ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can
be possessed by any one else." J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 68 (R. McCallum ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1859).
30. See pp. 968-70 infra.
31. Mnookin, supra note 24, at 229, 232.
32. Id. at 255-62.
33. Id. at 258-60.
34. Id. at 260-61.
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perspective for several reasons. First, a child's social and psychological
relationships with both parents ordinarily continue after the divorce.
A process that leads to agreement between the parents is preferable
to one that necessarily has a winner and a loser. A child's future
relationship with each of his parents is better ensured and his exist-
ing relationship less damaged by a negotiated settlement than by
one imposed by a court after an adversary proceeding. Notions of
child protection hardly justify general judicial suspicion of parental
agreements; the state's interest in the child's well-being in fact im-
plies a concomitant interest in facilitating parental agreement.
Second, the parents will know more about the child than will the
judge, since they have better access to information about the child's cir-
cumstances and desires. Indeed, a custody decision privately negotiated
by those who will be responsible for care after the divorce seems
much more likely than a judicial decision to match the parents' ca-
pacities and desires with the child's needs.
If parents have the authority to decide custodial arrangements,
there is no doubt that parents may make mistakes. But so may judges.
More fundamentally, given the epistemological problems inherent
in knowing what is best for a child, there is reason to doubt our
capacity to know whether any given decision is a mistake. Therefore,
the possibility that negotiated agreements may not be optimal for
the child hardly can be a sufficient argument against a preference
for private ordering. Moreover, because parents, not state officials,
are primarily responsible for the day-to-day child-rearing decisions
both before and after divorce, parents, not judges, should have pri-
mary authority to agree on custodial arrangements. This means that
courts should not second-guess parental agreements unless judicial
intervention is required by the narrow child-protection standard im-
plicit in neglect laws.35 This is not to suggest that the state does
not have an important responsibility to inform parents concerning
the child's needs during and after divorce; nor does it mean that
the state does not have an important interest in facilitating parental
agreement. Nevertheless, the law in action, which acknowledges sub-
stantial parental power, seems preferable to existing doctrine, which
imposes substantial restrictions on the parents' power to decide for
themselves.
35. See id. at 282.
For two articles emphasizing the importance of parental decisions, see Kubie, Provisions
for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YAux L.J.
1197 (1964); Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution
of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Spouses, 1976 DusE L.J. 911.
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II. The Elements of a Bargaining Model
Whether or not one accepts the desirability of private ordering,
it is clear that most divorcing couples do not require adjudication
of their disputes. It is therefore appropriate to analyze how the legal
system affects the bargaining behavior of divorcing couples.
A. Doctrinal Divisions from a Bargaining Perspective
Legal doctrine separates the potential consequences of divorce into
four distributional questions: (1) how should the couple's property
-the stock of existing wealth owned separately or together-be di-
vided? (marital property law) ; (2) what ongoing claims should each
spouse have on the future earnings of the other? (alimony law);
(3) what ongoing claims should a child have for a share of the earn-
ings or wealth of each of his parents? (child-support law); and (4)
how should the responsibilities and opportunities of child rearing
be divided in the future? (child-custody and visitation law).
These four strands of law, and the procedural mechanisms for their
implementation, are conventionally seen by legal commentators from
a highly regulatory perspective. Analysis seems premised on the no-
tion that the distributional consequences of divorce should be de-
termined through judicial or administrative proceedings in which
legal standards are imposed from above on the divorcing spouses.-6
Moreover, it is generally assumed that the doctrinal boundaries be-
tween these four issues are clear.37
Reexamination from the perspective of spouses who are negoti-
ating their own settlements suggests three important conclusions. First,
marital property, alimony, and child-support issues are all basically
problems of money, and the distinctions among them become very
blurred. Each can be translated into present dollar values. Although
there are differences among the three with respect to termination
and enforcement risks, the value of different bundles of the three
36. Professor Clark's hornbook on domestic relations, for example, devotes seven chap-
ters (over 300 pages) to divorce, alimony and property-division, child-support, and
custody issues. Only one chapter deals with separation agreements, and it emphasizes
problems of judicial enforcement and construction rather than the influence of the rules
on bargains. See H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 280-601. Law review articles in this field
typically focus on questions of the rules and procedures courts do or should employ in
adjudication, and they largely ignore the effect of the rules and standards on negotiations
outside of the courtroom.
37. Commentators typically discuss, for example, each doctrinal strand without ac-
knowledgment of its relationship to the others. See, e.g., Symposium, The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act: Strengths, Weaknesses, Alternatives, 18 S.D. L. Rxv. 531 (1973).
But see Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce,
21 SYRAcusE L. Rxv. 55, 59 (1969) (noting link between custody and money issues).
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elements can be compared. Second, custodial arrangements can often
be divided in a wide variety of ways. Third, the money and custody
issues are inextricably linked.
1. The Money Elements of the Bargain
a. Alimony and Child Support
From the economic perspective of bargaining spouses, alimony and
child support seem fungible: both involve periodic money payments
and, indeed, will often be paid by a single check from the noncus-
todial parent. A father may find it psychologically easier to pay
child support, which will presumably only help his children, than
alimony, which explicitly helps his former spouse. 38 But this char-
acterization hardly imposes much of a practical constraint. A custodial
spouse is not required to keep track of how child-support money is
spent, and the courts do not supervise child-support expenditures
once a payment has been made. Even if a court were concerned with
how transfer payments are spent, accounting would be extremely
difficult. Many tangible goods and services in a family setting have
some element of "joint consumption. ' 39 For example, the custodial
spouse and the child will generally share housing. This makes it
impossible to provide high-quality housing for the child without
also providing it for the custodial spouse. Similarly, it would be
difficult and expensive to provide the custodian and child with dif-
ferent diets and different social milieux. Consequently, child-support
payments that are used for housing and feeding the child will in-
evitably inure to the benefit of the custodial spouse.
Joint consumption may also create a normative dilemma with
respect to alimony and child-support standards. Divorce or separation
typically occasions an economic loss that must be borne by someone.
40
38. See Registrars Study, supra note 16, at 32 (English study found fathers more willing
to pay child support than alimony).
39. On joint consumption, see J. HEAD, PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 77-80, 167-
69, 176-79 (1974); J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MicRoECoNoMIC THEORY 270-72 (2d ed.
1971); E. MALINVAUD, LEcTURs ON MICROECONO.tiC THEORY 211-18 (1972).
40. An economic loss arises because separation or divorce typically causes the loss of
certain economies of scale that are common within a household. Housing for four people
living together in a single household will often cost less than the same quality of housing
for two separate households composed of a single individual and three persons respectively.
Economies of scale may also arise because of medical and auto insurance costs. Further-
more, some durable goods (washing machines, freezers, etc.) may come in sizes that
are too large for a single user. Parents may easily share one car until dissolution. After
the divorce, two cars may become necessary, or one parent may be forced to use public
transportation.
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Our legal and cultural norms reflect the notion that children should
not bear the economic loss, 41 and that, other things being equal, the
spouses should bear the loss equally. 42 Because joint consumption
implies that the custodial parent and children must essentially share
the same standard of living, a dilemma arises: either the children
must bear some part of the economic loss, or the noncustodial parent
must bear much more of the extra financial burdens imposed by
divorce than the custodial spouse.
43
Financial provision for a spouse terminates automatically on re-
marriage or death, while child-support normally ends when a child
reaches his majority or is emancipated. 44 The parents will know
how many years remain before a child will reach majority; however,
there may be considerable uncertainty about the probability that a
spouse who is receiving alimony will remarry. Therefore, the char-
acterization of the elements of payments will probably affect a party's
calculation of the risks concerning how long a payment will last and
41. The goal has been to set child support at a level allowing the children "'to be
brought up with as nearly as possible the same standard of opportunity as they would
have enjoyed had the marriage not failed."' R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 205 (undated) (quoting PurrING ASUNDER: A
DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (report of group appointed by Archbishop of
Canterbury to study reform of divorce law, Jan. 1964)); see H. CLARK, supra note 6, at
496 ("Within the limits of the husband's means, the child is entitled to an adequate
provision for his needs, one which reflects the income level and scale of living of the
family before the divorce.'); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super.
Ct. 26, 28, 344 A.2d 578, 579 (1975) (stating as "blackletter" law principle that "respon-
sibility of the parents, to support the child to the best of their ability, consistent with
their own station in life, is 'well nigh absolute' "); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 309(3) (enacted in five jurisdictions) (prescribing as one relevant factor in determination
of appropriate child-support payments "the standard of living the child would have
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved").
42. The husband and wife now occupy a position of equal partners. Whether the
marriage continues or is severed, the woman is as fully equipped as the man to earn
a living. The husband and wife share equal rights and obligations in the marriage
relationship and share equal burdens in the event the marriage is dissolved.
Spotts v. Spotts, 355 So. 2d 228, 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
1978); cf. Orr v. Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1979) (statutory scheme imposing
alimony obligation on husbands but not wives violates equal protection clause).
43. Professor Areen suggests that the economic allocation between spouses at divorce
can be seen as governed by one of five conflicting principles: the fault principle, the need
principle, the rehabilitation principle, the status principle, and the contribution principle.
J. AREEN, FAMILY LAxw 634-35 (1978). With the exception of the status principle-which
would require spousal support at a level permitting the custodial parent to maintain his
or her prior economic status-each of the other principles said to underlie alimony is
different from the governing principle for child support. Consequently, to the extent there
is joint consumption, the dilemma would exist.
44. Some statutes provide for automatic termination of alimony upon remarriage
unless the parties provide otherwise; absent a statute, remarriage provides grounds for
modification. See H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 457-59. On child support, see R. MNOORIN,
supra note 21, at 192.
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how easily it can be modified in the future. The characterization of
the elements may also affect the tax consequences. 45 However, the
tax laws give divorcing spouses broad power to control by their own
agreement the characterization, and hence tax consequences, of sup-
port payments. 46 Presumably, each spouse is only interested in the
risk-adjusted flow of his or her net income after taxes, taking into
account the receipt or payment of interspousal money transfers. Thus,
to the extent that the different consequences of alternative legal
characterizations can be known and evaluated in advance, alimony
and child support remain largely fungible for bargaining purposes.
b. Lump-Sum Payments versus Payments over Time
From a bargaining perspective, the more important distinction will
be between a lump-sum transfer of money or property, which is
typical of marital property, and payments over time, whether ali-
mony, child support, or a combination of the two. Inflation aside,
receiving $100 today is preferable for several reasons to receiving a
promise of $10 each year for ten years. First, the present value of
any stream of future payments must reflect a discount for the fact
that the total amount is unavailable to invest or spend during the
entire ten-year period. Second, when a recipient is receiving money
over time, he or she faces the risk that the promise may be broken,
or may be enforceable only at considerable expense.47 Periodic ali-
mony or child-support payments thus pose risks of noncollection that
are avoided by a lump-sum settlement. Finally, lump-sum and peri-
odic transfers are taxed differently under the Internal Revenue Code.
48
Despite these important differences, it would not seem especially
difficult during bargaining to convert lump-sum offers into offers
involving flows over time. For any set of time preferences, one spouse
can in principle convert a money flow over time into a present-value
equivalent.49 Moreover, a recipient can always discount the value of
45. Alimony is deductible from the income of the payor and is included in the income
of the recipient, while child support is not deductible by the payor, and is not included
in the income of the custodial spouse or the child. See I.R.C. §§ 71,215.
46. See Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
47. See generally R. MNOOK'N, supra note 21, at 200-03 (discussing problems of en-
forcing child-support obligations). The risk of nonpayment is substantial. Evidence sug-
gests that many fathers fail to make child-support and alimony payments after divorce.
See Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing
for Nonpayment of Support, 75 MicH. L. REv. 900, 904-27 (1977).
48. See I.R.C. § 71(c). Lump-sum property settlements, unlike alimony, are not in-
cluded in the taxable income of the recipient. See id. § 71(d).
49. See generally J. HIRSHLEIFER, INVESTMENT, INTEMRsT AND CAPITAL 31-45 (1970) (dis-
cussing intertemporal choice). Obviously the two spouses may have different time prefer-
ences, and as a consequence apply different discount rates.
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a promise to reflect the perceived risks that the full amount may
never be received. Finally, the tax consequences of alternatives can
be evaluated and compared.
This ability to compare different packages has obvious implica-
tions for private bargaining, at least -when the couple has sufficient
economic resources. Sophisticated parties and their lawyers will at-
tempt to seek out circumstances in which a different characterization,
because of tax effects or differences in risk or time preferences of
the parties, can make both spouses better off.50
2. Custody
The remaining element of the bargain concerns the custodial duties
and rights of the parents. By varying the time the child spends with
each parent, and by assigning particular child-rearing tasks to one
parent or the other, a divorce settlement may divide prerogatives
in many different ways. At the extreme, one parent may be entirely
responsible for the child all the time, with the other spouse spending
no time with the child. Or, divorcing parents may agree to share
child-rearing responsibilities equally after divorce through joint cus-
tody.51 For example, the child may live with each parent one-half of
the time, with the parents together deciding where and how the
child should be educated, who the pediatrician should be, etc. Be-
tween these extremes, many other alternatives are often possible.
3. The Relationship of Custody and Money
The preceding analysis suggests that, to a considerable degree, it
is possible to reduce the concerns of divorce bargaining into two
elements: money and custody. -5 2 From a bargaining perspective, even
50. The fungible nature of the money elements can be seen from a simple example.
Suppose the only asset that divorcing spouses own is a car worth $10,000. The parties
agree that each is entitled to one-half the value, and that one of them (let us assume the
husband) wants to keep the car after divorce. Obviously he could simply pay his wife
$5,000 at the time of divorce for her share of the marital property. Alternatively, he
might offer her periodic payments. Presumably the wife would not accept his offer of
$500-a-year alimony for 10 years as equivalent to $5,000 at the time of divorce. Such an
offer would not reflect the time value of money, a premium for the risk to the wife that
the husband might not pay in the future, or the differences in tax consequences. On the
other hand, there might be some periodic payment-say $2,000 a year for three years-
that the wife would prefer to a lump-sum payment of $5,000. If the parties have different
time preferences (and hence discount rates) there may be a set of periodic payments that
both spouses prefer to a given lump-sum transfer.
51. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARmr 173-77 (1978) (calling for
statutory or, in its absence, common law presumption of joint custody).
52. Although in what follows, we summarize the concerns of the divorcing spouses in
terms of "money" and "custody," the analysis does not rest on there being only two
elements of exchange. Alimony, child support, and marital property could be treated as
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these two elements are inextricably linked for two reasons: over some
range of alternatives, each parent may be willing to exchange cus-
todial rights and obligations for income or wealth, and parents may
tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as a means of enforcing
their rights without resort to court.
Economic analysis suggests that a parent may, over some range,
trade custodial rights for money. Although this notion may offend
some, a contrary assertion would mean that a parent with full cus-
tody would accept no sum of money in exchange for slightly less
custody, even if the parent were extremely poor. Faced with such
alternatives, most parents would prefer to see the child a bit less and
be able to give the child better housing, more food, more education,
better health care, and some luxuries. Suggesting the possibility of
such trade-offs does not mean that the parent would be willing to
relinquish all time with the child for a sufficiently large sum of
money. Indeed, with a minimum level of resources, a parent may
have a parallel minimum of custodial rights for the reduction of
which no additional payment, however large, could be adequate
compensation.
The negotiating process itself provides many opportunities for the
parties to link money and custody issues. The most obvious oppor-
tunity exists in the context of enforcement of support or visitation.
The legal system does not permit these connections in most states:
in a suit brought to collect overdue support payments, a father can-
not defend on the ground that his ex-wife did not permit visitation.53
Nor have courts permitted a custodial parent to cut off visitation
because of a failure to pay support.5 4 Nevertheless, it is often time-
different commodities. The bargain analysis would still apply because these commodities
are substitutes for each other and represent different forms that money transfers can take.
We have identified four dimensions along which alimony, child support, and marital
property transfers may differ: (I) time flow; (2) tax conseqences; (3) risks of nonpayment;
and (4) enforcement characteristics. Along each of these dimensions, every combination
of property, alimony, and child support might be rated. Our use of money as an index for
all three suggests simply that any combination can be reduced to a single valuation
number.
53. See, e.g., In re Dooley, 30 Or. App. 989, 569 P.2d 627 (1977) (custodial parent's
interference with visitation not in itself change of circumstances warranting reduction or
elimination of child support); H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 504 & n.59, 513 & n.63 (majority
of cases hold that child support must continue despite violation of custody decree as to
visitation). But see Hudson v. Hudson, 412 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (child-support
arrearages of father cancelled by court because of mother's interference Mith his visitation
rights); cf. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 241 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (court may suspend alimony
payments or cancel arrears if custodial parent wrongfully interferes with or withholds
visitation); H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 538 & n.11 (many cases refuse recovery for alimony
if custodial parent violates provisions of separation agreement).
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 52 Ohio App. 2d 180, 368 N.E.2d 1273 (1977).
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consuming and expensive to enforce promises in court. There can
be substantial advantages, therefore, from the perspective of one or
both bargainers, in having piecemeal bargains that spread support
payments over time and, as a practical matter, link the custody issue
(especially visitation) with the financial issues. 55 If a father who values
visitation fails to make support payments, then, quite apart from the
mother's ability to enforce his promise in court (which may often
be too slow and expensive to be effective), the mother may believe
that she can retaliate by informally cutting off the father's visitation
or making it more difficult. Even though this tactic has no legal
validity, it is nevertheless likely to be faster, cheaper, and more ef-
fective than court enforcement. Similarly, a father may believe that
his ability to cut off support will ensure that the mother will keep
her word concerning visitation."0
55. Thomas Schelling has pointed out the advantages of the "tactic of decomposition"
to "cultivate the necessary mutual expectations" for agreements to be reached. Schelling,
An Essay on Bargaining, in BARGAINING 386 (0. Young ed. 1975). He gives the following
example: Two individuals do not particularly trust one another. Each wishes to give
S1,000,000 to the Red Cross, but only if the other also gives $1,000,000. In a world where
their mutual promises cannot be enforced in court, "each may be tempted to cheat if the
other contributes first, and each one's anticipation of the other's cheating will inhibit
agreement." Id. Schelling points out, however, that
if the contribution is divided into consecutive small contributions, ... each can
keep the other on short tether to the finish, [and] no one ever need risk more than
one small contribution at a time. Finally, this change in the incentive structure itself
takes most of the risk out of the initial contribution; the value of established trust
is made obviously visible to both.
Id. at 336-37.
The tactic of decomposition, or piecemeal bargains, seems relevant in the divorce con-
text. It suggests why visitation and support will often be intertwined. Suppose divorcing
parents have a nine-year-old child. The mother might say to the father, "I will agree to
be the child's primary custodian. Your share of child support during the remainder of
his minority is $25,000. Pay me this amount now, I will raise the child, and I promise not
to interfere with your right to visit your child on a reasonable basis." Let us assume
that the father thinks that the $25,000 is a reasonable amount for child support, and
wants the mother to be primary custodian. Nevertheless, if the father thinks that there
are risks that the mother might try to inhibit visitation, and if enforcement of visitation
rights is difficult or expensive, he may much prefer dividing support payments to the
mother into monthly installments, the discounted value of which equals $25,000. By spread-
ing the support payments over time, the father would retain the practical power of retalia-
tion. Although interference with visitation may not be a defense to the failure to make
support payments, see note 53 supra, the father could effectively shift the enforcement
burdens of collecting support to the wife. If payments are spread over time, the wife, of
course, assumes the risk that the husband may fail to make a promised payment. See
p. 962 supra. Nevertheless, apart from suing the husband for breach, she may have an
effective practical remedy as well: she can make visitation more difficult for the husband.
If visitation is important to the father, this may act as an important deterrent.
56. This is not as normatively distasteful, in terms of its effect on the child, as it may
seem at first glance. If withholding support payments is an effective way of ensuring that
the custodial spouse will not interfere with court-ordered visitation, it is certainly not as
potentially damaging to the child as the legally sanctioned alternatives: calling out the
sheriff to force surrender of the child, or moving for a contempt order that would put
the custodial parent in jail until a promise to comply with visitation is exacted.
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The links between support and visitation are nurtured not only
by the parties' power to take self-help measures, but also by impor-
tant cultural values. Many believe that support obligations and visi-
tation rights are inextricably tied together in terms of what it means
to be a parent. A father who fails to support his children, at least
when he has the financial capacity to do so, may in popular perception
no longer be entitled to maintain a relationship with his minor chil-
dren if the custodial mother objects. Similarly, a mother who pur-
posely prevents a father from maintaining his relationship with his
children after a divorce may be viewed as no longer entitled to his
support.
B. Toward a Theory of Divorce Bargaining
Ideally, a bargaining theory would allow us to predict how alter-
native legal rules would affect negotiations between particular spouses
and the deal, if any, they would strike. Such a theory might be
combined with knowledge of how the characteristics that determine
bargaining behavior are distributed among divorcing couples. Alter-
native rules and procedures could then be compared by evaluating
the patterns of bargains that would result under each. Unfortunately,
no existing theory of bargaining allows confident prediction of how
different legal rules and procedures would influence outcomes; nor
is there much information about current patterns and outcomes of
the bargaining process.
What follows is not a complete theory. Instead, we identify five
factors that seem to be important influences or determinants of the
outcomes of bargaining, and then offer some observations on the
bargaining process. The factors are (1) the preferences of the di-
vorcing parents; (2) the bargaining endowments created by legal
rules that indicate the particular allocation a court will impose if
the parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of uncertainty
concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to court, which is
linked to the parties' attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs and
the parties' respective abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic be-
havior.
1. Parental Preferences
Parental preferences vary with regard to money and child-rearing
responsibilities. Ordinarily, economists assume that a person's tastes
for most goods and services are insatiable: no matter how much a
person has, he will see himself as better off with more. This is cer-
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tainly a reasonably apt description of most people's taste for money;
other things being equal, nearly everyone would prefer having more
money to having less. 57 This is not to say, of course, that people
view the relative importance of money in the same way.
Preferences with regard to custody, however, probably vary a great
deal more from person to person. Many individuals like spending
time with their children and are willing to sacrifice a great deal in
order to have child-rearing responsibilities. Sadly, some parents might
pay a great deal to avoid child-rearing tasks altogether. There are
also a wide variety of prerogatives and duties associated with child
rearing, and parental preferences may vary among them. A parent
may value very highly some tasks, like reading the child a bedtime
story, and place negative value on others, like shopping for school
clothes. Preferences may vary depending on how much custody a
parent has; a parent will not necessarily prefer more. Some parents
with limited child-rearing responsibilities may be willing to sacrifice
money for additional custody up to a certain point; but once they
have "enough" custody, they may be willing to give up money to
avoid additional responsibility. For other parents, no amount of
money can adequately compensate for a reduction in custody below
a certain minimum level. Above that point, however, trade-offs be-
tween money and custody would be consistent with their tastes.
Informed bargaining requires a parent to assess accurately his or
her own preferences concerning custodial alternatives. Yet the assess-
ments are difficult and complicated. The information each parent
has relates to the actual division of child-rearing tasks in an ongoing
family. Dissolution or divorce inevitably alters this division, and the
parent may discover new advantages or disadvantages to child-rearing
responsibilities. Moreover, the parents' own needs may alter drastically
after divorce.5s A parent interested in dating may find the child an
intrusion in a way that the child never was during marriage. Addi-
tionally, a parent's interest in children may vary according to their
age. Because children and parents both change, and changes may
be unpredictable, projecting parental preferences for custody ten years
into the future is a formidable task. Nevertheless, most parents have
some self-awareness, however imperfect, and no third party (such as
57. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 21-49 (2d ed. 1975).
58. See Hetherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER/CHILD
FATHER/CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 162-73 (J. Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978); Wallerstein &
Kelly, Divorce Counseling: A Community Service for Families in the Midst of Divorce, 47
Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 4, 6 (1977).
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a judge) is likely to have better information about a parent's tastes,
present or future. 9
Parental preferences, of course, will not generally be determined
solely by self-interested judgments; a bargaining theory must take
note of possible altruism or spite. One hopes that parental prefer-
ences reflect a desire for their children's happiness and well-being,
quite apart from any parental advantage. 60
For example, a father may commit himself to child-support pay-
ments beyond what he predicts a court would require, simply because
he does not want his children to suffer economic detriment from a
divorce. A mother may agree to substantial visitation for the father
because she thinks this is good for the children, even though she
personally despises the father and wants nothing more to do with
him. Similarly, either or both spouses may have preferences that
attach great weight to the happiness and desires of their former spouse.
At the other extreme, one can easily imagine preferences that re-
flect spite and envy. A spouse may simply have a strong wish to
punish the other spouse, regardless of the detriment to himself or
to the children. An angry parent may engage in a protracted and
largely hopeless custody fight, exhausting his financial reserves and
bringing emotional torment to the children, simply to punish his
spouse.
2. How Legal Rules Create Bargaining Endowments
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth
and custodial prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow
of the law. The legal rules governing alimony, child support, marital
property, and custody give each parent certain claims based on what
each would get if the case went to trial. In other words, the outcome
that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives each parent
certain bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts.
A simplified example may be illustrative. Assume that in disputed
custody cases the law flatly provided that all mothers had the right
to custody of minor children and that all fathers only had the right
to visitation two weekends a month. Absent some contrary agreement
59. See note 29 supra. A major role for lawyers in the divorce process is to help
clients clarify their own preferences. See p. 985 infra (lawyer's role as counselor); cf.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1976) (duty of lawyer to ensure that
client is fully informed of all relevant considerations).
60. Obviously, one can get into substantial linguistic tangles here. See G. HARIAN,
THE NATURE OF MORALITY 137-39 (1977) (problem of differentiating self-interest from
desire to promote welfare of others).
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acceptable to both parents, a court would order this arrangement.
Assume further that the legal rules relating to marital property, ali-
mony, and child support gave the mother some determinate share
of the family's economic resources. In negotiations under this regime,
neither spouse would ever consent to a division that left him or her
worse off than if he or she insisted on going to court. The range of
negotiated outcomes would be limited to those that leave both par-
ents as well off as they would be in the absence of a bargain.01
If private ordering were allowed, we would not necessarily expect
parents to split custody and money the way a judge would if they
failed to agree. The father might well negotiate for more child-time
and the mother for less. This result might occur either because the
father made the mother better off by giving her additional money
to compensate her for accepting less child-time, or because the mother
found custody burdensome and considered herself better off with
less custody. Indeed, she might agree to accept less money, or even
to pay the father, if he agreed to relieve her of some child-rearing
responsibilities. In all events, because the parents' tastes with regard
to the trade-offs between money and child-time may differ, it will
often be possible for the parties to negotiate some outcome that
makes both better off than they would be if they simply accepted
the result a court would impose.
3. Private Ordering Against a Backdrop of Uncertainty
Legal rules are generally not as simple or straightforward as is
suggested by the last example. Often, the outcome in court is far
from certain, with any number of outcomes possible. Indeed, exist-
ing legal standards governing custody, alimony, child support, and
marital property are all striking for their lack of precision and thus
provide a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty. The almost
universal judicial standard for resolving custody disputes is the "best
interests of the child."' 2 Except in situations when one parent poses
a substantial threat to the child's well-being, predicting who will get
custody under this standard is difficult indeed, especially given the
increasing pressure to reject any presumption in favor of maternal
61. This analysis rests on the assumption that a spouse will act in his own self-interest.
The conclusion allows for altruism or spite, provided that a spouse's preferences meet
certain requirements of consistency. In particular, each spouse must be able to rank every
possible combination of money/custody divisions in a way that is "transitive." In other
words, if a spouse prefers custody/money division A to division B, and prefers division B
to division C, then the spouse must also prefer division A to division C.
62. See Mnookin, supra note 24, at 236-37 & nn.45-47 (citing statutes and cases).
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custody.6 3 Similarly, standards governing alimony and child support
are also extraordinarily vague and allow courts broad discretion in
disputed cases. 64
Analyzing the effects of uncertainty on bargaining is an extremely
complicated task. It is apparent, however, that the effects in any
particular case will depend in part on the attitudes of the two spouses
toward risk-what economists call "risk preferences." 65 This can be
illustrated by considering a mechanism suggested in Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child60 for resolving custody disputes between equally
acceptable spouses: they would draw straws, with the winner getting
full custodial rights and the loser none.
6 7
Because drawing straws, like flipping a coin, 5 gives each parent
a fifty percent chance of receiving full custody, economic theory sug-
gests that for each parent the "expected" outcome is half-custody.0 9
We cannot, however, simply assume that each parent will bargain as
if receiving half of the child's time were certain. Attitudes toward
63. See id. at 235-36.
64. See J. AREEN, supra note 43, at 653 ('Statutes which authorize courts to award
child support tend to be written in so general a fashion as to leave judges almost total
discretion in the matter."); H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 3 (precedents on alimony of
"slight value"; "relevant factors [in determining alimony] are so numerous and their in-
fluence so incapable of precise evaluation" that trial judge has great discretion); cf. White
& Stone, A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10
FAm. L.Q. 75 (1976) (statistical study of 1,300 cases in Florida county determined that there
was little consistency among trial judges as to which variables in determining alimony
and child support were significant, though high degree of individual predictability was
apparent).
It is more difficult to generalize about marital-property standards than about alimony
or child support. The governing standards with regard to marital property appear in
many jurisdictions to be more precise than those relating to custody, alimony, or child
support. Predicting how a court will treat marital property is rather straightforward in
community-property states that require equal division and in common law states that
normally apply the doctrine of equitable apportionment only in exceptional circumstances.
See J. AREEN, supra note 43, at 636-37. But in those community-property or common law
jurisdictions in which the court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, the
outcome if the parties resort to court will obviously be more uncertain. See generally I.
BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY (1973); H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 449-52; W. REPPY & W.
DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1975). At any rate, the following
generalization made by a commentator 40 years ago still seems apt: "Judicial discretion
is probably nowhere ... given freer rein, than in the field of domestic relations." Cooey,
The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
213, 213 (1939).
65. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMIES AND DECISIONS 12-38 (1957) (introduction to
problems of utility theory and decisionmaking under uncertainty); H. RAIFFA, DECISION
ANALYSIS 7-38 (1968) (same).
66. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
67. Id. at 153.
68. See generally Mnookin, supra note 24, at 289-91.
69. See generally P. HOEL, S. PORT & C. STONE, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY
48-108 (1971) (discussing mathematical expectations).
970
Divorce and Dispute Resolution
risk may be defined by asking a parent to compare two alternatives:
(1) a certainty of having one-half of the child's time; or (2) a gamble
in which the "expected" or average outcome is one-half of the child's
time. By definition, a parent who treats these alternatives as equally
desirable is risk-neutral. A parent who would accept a certain out-
come of less than half-custody in order to avoid the gamble-the
chance of losing the coin flip and receiving no custody-is risk-averse.
Other parents may be risk preferers: they would rather take the
gamble and have a fifty percent chance of winning full custody than
accept the certain outcome of split custody.
The reality of custody litigation is more complicated, and the
knowledge of the parties much less complete, than in our hypotheti-
cal. The parties in the example know the standard for decision and
the odds of winning custody in court. But in real situations, the exact
odds of various possible outcomes are not known by the parties;
often they do not even know what information or criteria the judge
will use in deciding.
70
4. Transaction Costs
Costs are involved in resolving the distributional consequences of
separation or divorce, and in securing the divorce itself. The trans-
action costs7 ' that the parties must bear may take many forms, some
financial and some emotional. The most obvious and tangible involve
the expenditure of money. Professional fees-particularly for lawyers-
must be paid by one or both parties.7 2 In addition, there are filing
70. See note 64 supra.
71. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 434-41, 445-47 (2d ed. 1977)
(analyzing effect of costs of legal process on decision of parties whether to settle or go to
trial).
72. The general rule in civil litigation is that, absent express statutory authority to
award fees and costs, each party bears his or her own attorneys' fees. In many jurisdic-
tions, however, attorneys' fees in divorce actions are an exception to this general rule. In
Connecticut, for example, although there is no statutory provision with respect to at-
torneys' fees, it appears that courts often require husbands to pay the fees of their wives.
See Buchman, Post Divorce Decree Awards of Counsel Fees, 44 CONN. B.J. 359, 359-61
(1970). In Texas, courts have included attorneys' fees within the "doctrine of necessaries,"
under which each spouse has a duty to support the other. This doctrine, codified in
TEx. FA.t. CODE ANN. tit. I, § 4.02 (Vernon 1975), is seen as giving authority for the
discretionary award of attorneys' fees. See Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Divorce
Litigation in Texas, 13 Hous. L. Rlv. 1016, 1016-17 (1976). Many other states have express
statutory provisions allowing for an award of attorneys' fees to either party within the
discretion of the court. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4370 (Nest Supp. 1979).
If a divorcing spouse cannot afford an attorney, and the other spouse lacks the means
to pay for the attorney, it may be possible to secure legal assistance through legal aid.
However, it has also been held that there is no constitutional right of indigents to state-
provided counsel for divorce. See In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 437-38, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55-58,
369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (1975).
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fees and court costs. 7 3 More difficult to measure, but also important,
are the emotional and psychological costs involved in the dispute-set-
tlement process. Lawsuits generally are emotionally burdensome;74
the psychological costs imposed by bargaining (and still more by liti-
gation) are particularly acute in divorce.7 5
The magnitude of these transaction costs, both actual and expected,
can influence negotiations and the outcome of bargaining. In the
dissolution process, one spouse, and that spouse's attorney, can sub-
stantially affect the magnitude of the transaction costs that must be
borne by the other spouse. As is generally the case, the party better
able to bear the transaction costs, whether financial or emotional,
will have an advantage in divorce bargaining.
In divorce, transaction costs will generally tend to be (1) higher
if there are minor children involved, because of the additional and
intensely emotional allocational issues to be determined; (2) an in-
creasing function of the amount of property and income the spouses
have, since it is rational to spend more on negotiation when the
possible rewards are higher;7 6 and (3) higher when there is a broad
range of possible outcomes in court.
5. Strategic Behavior
The actual bargain that is struck through negotiations-indeed,
whether a bargain is struck at all-depends on the negotiation process.
During this process, each party transmits information about his or
her own preferences to the other. This information may be accurate
or intentionally inaccurate; each party may promise, threaten, or
bluff.7 7 Parties may intentionally exaggerate their chances of winning
73. Generally, the award of costs to either party is within the discretion of the court.
See note 72 supra (citing sources). The Supreme Court has held that due process prohibits
the state from denying, solely on the basis of inability to pay, access to courts for in-
dividuals seeking dissolution of marriage. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82
(1971).
74. See Address by Learned Hand, Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(Nov. 17, 1921), excerpted in D. LOULSELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1295
(3d ed. 1973) ("[A]s a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short
of sickness and death.")
75. See, e.g., R. DEWOLF, THE BONDS OF ACRIMONY 39-55 (1970).
76. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 71, at 436 ("other things being equal, the higher the
stakes in a case the more likely it is to be litigated"); Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litiga-
tion Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges? (forthcoming). Cooter and Korn-
hauser suggest that the litigation rate may not be higher in disputes involving larger
sums. Transaction costs may be higher even if the litigation rates are not because transac-
tion costs include costs of settlement and attempted settlement. Id.
77. A father, for example, may pretend that he wants custody and is willing to litigate
the issue simply to intimidate a risk-averse mother into settling for less money. See Law-
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in court in the hope of persuading the other side to accept less. Or
they may threaten to impose substantial transaction costs-economic
or psychological-on the other side. In short, there are a variety of
ways in which the parties may engage in strategic behavior during
the bargaining process.
7 8
Opportunities for strategic behavior exist because the parties often
will not know with certainty (1) the other side's true preferences with
regard to the allocational outcomes; (2) the other spouse's preferences
or attitudes towards risk; and (3) what the outcome in court will
be, or even what the actual odds in court are. Although parents may
know a great deal about each other's preferences for money and
children, complete knowledge of the other spouse's attitudes is un-
likely.
How do parties and their representatives actually behave during
the process? Two alternative models are suggested by the literature:
(1) a Strategic Model, which would characterize the process as "a
relatively norm-free process centered on the transmutation of under-
lying bargaining strength into agreement by the exercise of power,
horse-trading, threat, and bluff";79 and (2) a Norm-Centered Model,
which would characterize the process by elements normally associated
with adjudication-the parties and their representatives would invoke
rules, cite precedents, and engage in reasoned elaboration." Anec-
dotal observation suggests that each model captures part of the flavor
of the process. The parties and their representatives do make appeals
to legal and social norms in negotiation, but they frequently threaten
and bluff as well.81
C. The Task Facing the Spouses and the Process of Negotiation
The task facing divorcing spouses can be summarized, based on
the preceding analysis, as one of attempting through bargaining to
divide money and child-rearing responsibilities to reflect personal
preferences. Even though the interests of the two parents may sub-
stantially conflict, opportunities for making both parents better off
yering for the Child, supra note 27, at 1131 n.21 (citing interview with Assistant Clerk of
New Haven Superior Court). The prevailing best interests standard exacerbates the dis-
advantages of a risk-averse parent because of its great uncertainty. See p. 979 infra.
78. The concept of strategic behavior is not without ambiguity. We use it to mean
behavior in which the parties misrepresent their own intentions, desires, or chances of
winning in order to obtain a strategic advantage in negotiation.
79. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 638.
80. Id. at 638-39.
81. Cf. id. at 680-81 (interplay of evocation of norms and use of bargaining power).
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This analysis suggests why most divorcing couples never require
adjudication for dispute settlement. The parties gain substantial ad-
vantages when they can reach an agreement concerning the distribu-
tional consequences of divorce. They can minimize the transaction
costs involved in adjudication. They can avoid its risks and uncer-
tainties, and negotiate an agreement that may better reflect their
individual preferences.
Furthermore, divorcing spouses usually have no incentive to take
cases to court for their precedential value. Unlike insurance com-
panies, public-interest organizations, and other "repeat players," a
divorcing spouse will generally have no expectation that an adjudi-
cated case will create precedent, or that any precedent created will
be of personal benefit in future litigation.
83
Given the advantages of negotiated settlements, why do divorcing
spouses ever require courtroom adjudication of their disputes? There
are a variety of reasons why some divorce cases will be litigated:
1. Spite. One or both parties may be motivated in substantial mea-
sure by a desire to punish the other spouse, rather than simply to
increase their own net worth.
2. Distaste for Negotiation. Even though it costs more, one or both
parties may prefer the adjudicative process (with third-party de-
cision) to any process that requires a voluntary agreement with the
other spouse. Face-to-face contact may be extremely distasteful, and
82. The bargaining situation may be diagrammatically illustrated by using an "Edge-
worth box," in which the two axes represent money and child-time. The trade offs for
each spouse may be represented by indifference curves. The points of tangency of these
curves, where the marginal rates of substitution between money and custody are identical
for the two spouses, create a "contract curve" of Pareto-optimal outcomes. On Edgeworth
boxes, see J. HENDERSON 8 R. QUANDT, supra note 39, at 162-64.
83. Analysis of the incentives for litigation and for the creation of precedent is be-
ginning to emerge. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 76. On the differences in incentives for litigation
among various sorts of litigants, see Galanter, supra note 3. Galanter characterizes divorce
and custody disputes as involving "one-shotters," id. at 97, on both sides, rather than
"repeat players," id. at 107.
It is interesting to speculate about whether the divorce bar ever has an interest in
promoting certain sorts of litigation for their precedential value. In personal injury cases,
for example, in which lawyers typically represent either plaintiffs or defendants exclu-
sively, plaintiffs' attorneys may have an interest in precedent because they will continue
to represent victims of accidents, never insurance companies. There is some specialization
in the divorce bar, including lawyers who only represent husbands, or only represent
wives. In such circumstances, the attorney may have an interest in precedent quite apart
from the interests of any particular client.
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the parties may not be able to negotiate-even with lawyers acting
as intermediaries-because of distrust or distaste.
3. Calling the Bluff-The Breakdown of Negotiations. If the par-
ties get heavily engaged in strategic behavior and get carried away
with making threats, a courtroom battle may result, despite both
parties' preference for a settlement. Negotiations may resemble a
game of "chicken" in which two teenagers set their cars on a col-
lision course to see who turns first. Some crack-ups may result.
4. Uncertainty and Risk Preferences. The exact odds for any given
outcome in court are unknown, and it has been suggested that liti-
gants typically overestimate their chances of winning. 4 To the extent
that one or both of the parties typically overestimate their chances
of winning, more cases will be litigated than in a world in which
the outcome is uncertain but the odds are known. In any event,
when the outcome is uncertain, settlement prospects depend on the
risk preferences of the two spouses.8 5
5. No Middle Ground. If the object of dispute cannot be divided
into small enough increments-whether because of the law, 6 the
practical circumstances, 7 or the nature of the subject at issue 8 -
there may be no middle ground on which to strike a feasible com-
promise. Optimal bargaining occurs when, in economic terminology,
nothing is indivisible.
These points can be illustrated through a simple example. Assume
a divorcing couple has no children and the only issue is how they
will divide 100 shares of stock worth $10,000. Let us further assume
that it would cost each spouse $1,000 to have a court decide this
issue, and that each spouse must pay his own litigation costs.
If the outcome in court were entirely certain, would the parties
ever litigate? Suppose it were clear that a court would inevitably
84. See Aubert, Courts and Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 40, 44
(1967).
85. See p. 970 supra.
86. Child custody would have limited divisibility in jurisdictions in which joint custody
is forbidden or actively discouraged by courts, see, e.g., Rickard v. Rickard, 7 Wash.
App. 907, 503 P.2d 763 (1972), petition for review denied, 81 Wash. 2d 1012, 503 P.2d 763
(1973) (joint custody to be avoided if possible and ordered only in exceptional circum-
stances); Martin v. Martin, 132 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939" (child cannot grow up
normally with split custody), or if the proposal of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
were adopted, see pp. 980-83 infra.
87. If the parents live a great distance from each other, it may not be possible to
divide child-time between them in a manner reflecting their preferences.
88. This would be the case, for example, if there were one piece of marital property
so valuable, for sentimental or other reasons, that neither party could be compensated
for giving up his share by getting all the couple's other assets, and if neither party would
consent to its being auctioned off.
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award one-half of the stock to each spouse because it would be char-
acterized as community propcrty. If the issue were litigated, each
spouse would end up with only $4,000. A spouse would therefore
never accept a settlement offer of less than $4,000. One might expect
that the parties would normally simply settle for $5,000, and save the
costs of litigation. Taking the issue to court would substitute an
expensive mode of dispute resolution-adjudication-for a cheaper
mode-negotiation.
Even when the outcome in court is certain, litigation is still pos-
sible. A spouse might engage in strategic behavior and threaten to
litigate in order to get more than half. Suppose the husband threat-
ened to litigate unless the wife agreed to accept a settlement of $4,500.
The wife might accept $4,500 but only if she believed the threat.
She would know with proper legal advice that her husband would
only end up with $4,000 if he litigated. Therefore the threat ordi-
narily would not be credible. She might call his bluff and tell him
to sue. If the wife were convinced, however, that her husband was
motivated by spite and in fact preferred to litigate rather than accept
less than $5,500, she might accept $4,500. If the outcome in court is
certain, then, absent spite, strategic behavior, or a distaste for ne-
gotiations, adjudication should not generally occur; litigation would
impose an expensive mode of dispute settlement when a less ex-
pensive alternative could achieve the same result.
What about cases in which the result in court is uncertain? As-
sume, for example, that there is a fifty percent chance that the hus-
band will get all $10,000, and a fifty percent chance that the wife
will get all $10,000.9 Settlement in these circumstances obviously
depends on the risk preferences of the two spouses. If both are risk-
neutral, then both will negotiate the same way as they would if they
knew for certain that a court would award each of them $5,000-the
"expected" value of the litigation in this case.
To the extent that the parties are both risk-averse-each is prepared
to accept less than $5,000 to avoid the risks of litigation-the parties
have a broader range of possible settlements that both would prefer
to the risks of litigation. This may facilitate agreement.
Conversely, if both parties are risk preferers-each prefers the gam-
ble to an offer of the expected value of $5,000-all cases are likely to
89. In real cases, the parties do not know the probability distribution of the various
outcomes a court might impose. This injects a further complication in the process and
creates the possibility that one or both parties may overestimate their own chances of
winning. This may result in more cases being litigated than in a world where the out-
come is uncertain but the odds are known.
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be litigated. When one party is a risk preferer and the other is risk-
averse, it is difficult to predict the effect on the rate of litigation. In
any negotiated outcome, a risk preferer will have an advantage over the
party who is risk-averse.
III. The Bargaining Framework Applied
A. Custody Standards: The Rule/Discretion Debate Revisited
There has been considerable debate about the advantages and dis-
advantages of legal standards that confer broad discretionary power
on decisionmakers. 90 But analysis has generally focused, both in the
family law context and elsewhere, on the effects of discretion on the
decisionmaking behavior of officials. We would like to suggest a
different perspective, focusing on the implications of discretionary
standards when they serve as the backdrop for out-of-court negotia-
tions by the parties themselves.
The effect on the process of divorce bargaining of having more
or less precise standards can be fruitfully explored by comparing and
contrasting the effects of three different custody standards, each of
which has proponents in current policy discussion:
1. A maternal-preference rule creates a strong presumption in favor
of giving custody to a mother, with the father having limited visi-
tation rights. 91 Until recently, this was the dominant standard.92
2. The best interests of the child standard calls for a highly indi-
vidualized determination, confers broad discretion on the judge, and
gives no automatic preference to either parent simply on the basis
of the parent's or the child's sex.93 This standard seems to be the
dominant one today.9 4 We will assume that ordinarily the parent who
is awarded custody will have care and control of the child for all
but two weekends a month, during which time the other spouse will
have visitation rights.
3. A joint-custody rule provides that in disputed cases each parent
will have care and control of a child for half the time. Although it
90. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcE (1969); P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUsTICr
(1969); R. POSNER, supra note 71, at 424-25; Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
91. See, e.g., R. LEVY, supra note 41, at 224-25 (recommending presumption that wife
be entitled to custody); Watson, supra note 37, at 82 (maternal preference for children
under 10, plus same-sex presumption for older children). See generally Mnookin, supra
note 24, at 135-36, 283-84.
92. See Mnookin, supra note 24, at 235-36.
93. See id. at 231-32, 235, 255-56.
94. Id. at 236.
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has been seriously proposed,93 no jurisdiction has adopted this rule.
Each of these three custody standards creates its own set of bar-
gaining endowments. Because different rules give various amounts
of bargaining chips to the parties, changing the standard would affect
each party's relative bargaining power and would therefore influence
the range and frequency of possible negotiated outcomes.
For example, if the legal standard were changed from a maternal-
preference rule to a standard that gave no preference based on par-
ental sex, then a father's chances of winning custody in a contested
case would be improved. This in turn would affect the outcomes
reached through negotiation, since it would generally increase the
bargaining power of fathers as a class and decrease the bargaining
power of mothers. Because of differences in parental preferences, how-
ever, not all fathers would end up with more child-time: some might
simply pay less in alimony or child support. Thus, our analysis sug-
gests that recent changes in custody law giving fathers more equal
claims to custody, and in alimony law limiting the extent and avail-
ability of permanent alimony,90 have strengthened the relative bar-
gaining power of husbands.
Both the best interests standard and the joint-custody rule are
"neutral" as between the sexes; nevertheless, they have very different
implications for bargaining. Under the best interests principle the
outcome in court will often be uncertain: each spouse may be able
to make a plausible claim for custody, and it may be impossible to
predict how a court would decide a disputed case. Under the joint-
custody standard, on the other hand, the parties both know what
will happen in court: each will be responsible for the child half the
time. Thus, comparison of these two standards allows us to explore
further the effects of uncertainty on the bargaining process.
Uncertainty has several important effects on the relative bargain-
ing power of the parties. As suggested earlier, if there is substantial
95. Traditionally, courts have been unwilling to approve joint, split, or divided custody
arrangements for small children. See, e.g., Utley v. Utley, 364 A.2d 1167 (D.C. 1976);
McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.V.2d 722 (Ky. 1961); Martin v. Martin, 132 S.W.2d 426
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939). More recently, however, some jurisdictions have been willing to
approve joint-custody arrangements when both parents desire such. See, e.g., Childers v.
O'Neal, 251 Ark. 1097, 476 S.W.2d 799 (1972); Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, 355
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1974) (relitigated with custody awarded to father in unreported decision
dated July 18, 1975; see Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1978)).
Some commentators today recommend joint custody as the superior alternative. See note
51 supra.
96. Commentators have suggested, for example, a trend "toward rehabilitative alimony
and away from permanent alimony." White & Stone, supra note 64, at 80. For a chart
summarizing changes in alimony laws, see Freed & Foster, supra note 13, at 309-10.
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variance among the possible court-imposed outcomes, the relatively
more risk-averse party is comparatively disadvantaged.97 The impor-
tant policy implications of this fact are illustrated by the following
example.
Assume that both the parents would like to have custody. The
father is risk-neutral; he would be indifferent if given a choice be-
tween (1) having custody of his child half the time; or (2) being
exposed to adjudication under the best interests standard and having
a fifty percent chance of winning full custodial rights and a fifty
percent chance of only having visitation rights. The mother, on the
other hand, we will assume is risk-averse; she would much prefer the
certainty of half the child's time to the risk of adjudication with a
fifty percent chance that she might end up only with visitation.
We would predict that under the best interests standard the mother,
because she is risk-averse, will accept less in order to avoid the gam-
ble inherent in adjudication. Both custody standards are "sex neutral,"
yet the best interests standard disadvantages a risk-averse parent and
the joint-custody rule does not. The fact that uncertainty about the
outcome in court concerning custody disadvantages the relatively more
risk-averse parent is a peculiarly ironic and tragic result. Most of us
would assume that a good parent would be unwilling to take a
gamble in which one outcome would substantially diminish his or
her relationship with the child. And yet the consequence of a vague,
discretionary rule is to disadvantage such a parent if he or she is
negotiating with a spouse who is more of a gambler.
98
Vague legal standards have other effects on the parties' relative
bargaining power and on negotiations. Uncertainty about the outcome
in court probably increases transaction costs. Imprecise legal standards
require an expert to estimate the probable outcome if the parties
go to court. A lawyer may be necessary simply for a person to learn
what his bargaining chips are. Moreover, because there may be no
objective source of information about the actual probabilities of
outcome in a particular case, the parties and their representatives
may spend considerable time attempting to persuade the other side
that it has overestimated its prospects for success.
It would also seem that vague legal standards give a relative ad-
vantage to the more able negotiator. As the dispersion among possible
outcomes in court becomes wider, there will be a greater premium
97. See p. 977 supra.
98. Solomon's threat to cut the child in half was perhaps founded on a belief that the
child's real mother would be more risk-averse than the false claimant.
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on bargaining skills, since there will be greater opportunities for
strategic behavior and a wider range of possible negotiated outcomes
that might leave a party better off than possible court-imposed out-
comes.
This analysis does not suggest any easy answer to the question
about the appropriate custody standard. It does show the importance
of analyzing the effects of legal standards on the dispute-settlement
process outside of court. Discretionary standards can substantially
affect the relative bargaining strength of the two parties, primarily
because their attitudes toward risk and capacities to bear transaction
costs may differ substantially.
Uncertainty can be reduced by making the legal standards more
precise. But, as demise of the maternal-preference rule suggests, cer-
tainty may be achievable only if we elevate the importance of a cri-
terion that is no longer considered appropriate.
Evaluation of the joint-custody rule suggests another dilemma: a
standard may have good characteristics as a background rule for pri-
vate ordering but may nevertheless be unacceptable as a standard
for adjudicating disputed cases. The advantages of the joint-custody
rule from the perspective of bargaining are that it does not disad-
vantage the relatively risk-averse parent, reduces the scope for strategic
behavior, and imposes lower transaction costs. Nevertheless, it would
probably be disastrous to impose joint custody on the parties if they
could not agree to it themselves, since joint custody normally requires
a very high degree of parental cooperation. Without such coopera-
tion, the substantial contact both parents would have with the child,
and necessarily with each other, would create endless possibilities for
antagonism between the parents, with predictably detrimental effects
on the child's well-being.99 Ordering joint custody may be very much
like carrying out Solomon's threat to cut the child in half.
B. The Visitation Proposal of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child:
How Limiting the Power to Make Binding Promises Can Affect
Dispute Settlement
The importance of analyzing the effects of reform proposals on
private ordering is dramatically illustrated by consideration of the
99. See, e.g., Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1978) ("[Joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alterna-
tive for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion .... As
a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents,
accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.")
(citations omitted).
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legal standard for visitation proposed in Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.00 They recommend that
[o]nce it is determined [by agreement of the divorcing parents
or by the court in the absence of agreement] who will be the
custodial parent, it is that parent, not the court, who must de-
cide under what conditions he or she wishes to raise the child.
Thus, the noncustodial parent should have no legally enforce-
able right to visit the child, and the custodial parent should have
the right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to have
such visits.'10
Much ink has been spilled over this controversial proposal.10 2 Many
behavioral scientists have suggested the importance from the child's
perspective of maintaining contact with the noncustodial parent. 1°1
Lawyers have challenged the proposal on grounds of fairness. 104 But
the critics-like the authors themselves-have largely failed to consider
the possible effects of the proposed standard on private ordering.10
From our perspective it is useful to ask what power the parents
would have to make their own law with respect to custodial arrange-
ments. This question points up a peculiar inconsistency. The book
makes it clear that the parents would have the right and the power
to determine by agreement "who will be the custodial parent."'106
A court would determine the custodial parent only if there were a
100. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 66.
101. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
102. See, e.g., Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social Action, 8
L w & Soc'y Rsv. 669, 680 (1974); Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1310 (1974);
Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 CoL.um. L. REv. 996, 1002-05 (1974).
103. See, e.g., Katkin, Bullington & Levine, supra note 102, at 672-75 (criticizing lack of
data base for visitation proposal and excessive reliance on inapposite or discredited
studies); Strauss & Strauss, supra note 102, at 1002 ("given a child with existing relation-
ships to both, we know of no [psychological] studies which show that the legal death of
one parent, the complete subordination of the child to the other's possibly distorted
view, is invariably the preferable step for its future development"); cf. Kelly & Waller-
stein, Part-Time Parent, Part-Time Child: Visiting After Divorce, 1977 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PsYcH. 51 (extensive study emphasizing importance to child of visiting noncustodial
parent).
104. See, e.g., Dembitz, supra note 102, at 1310 (characterizing proposal as "blind and
untenable'); Strauss & Strauss, supra note 102, at 1001 (noting that parent has claim in-
dependent of child).
105. The one clear exception is the review by Strauss & Strauss, supra note 102, at
1002-04. Katkin, Bullington & Levine, supra note 102, are concerned with the failure of
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit to consider how individuals might "circumvent" their pro-
posals generally. And Katkin, Bullington, and Levine do suggest that the visitation
proposals "might generate pressures to keep families intact" when a divorce might be
more beneficial. Id. at 680.
106. J. GOLDrMIN, A FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 66, at 38.
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dispute-i.e., "in the event each claims custody";107 if the parents
agreed, presumably a court would have no right to override their
determination. What is strange, however, is the extreme limitation
on the parents' legal powers: they can decide who will have full
custodial rights, but they have no power to bind themselves legally
to some alternative division of responsibilities concerning the child.
For example, they would not be able to make an enforceable agree-
ment giving the noncustodial parent visitation rights, nor could they
make a binding agreement to have joint custody.
The authors do not explain why parents, rather than a state offi-
cial, should be trusted to make the determination of who will have
all legal power over the child, but should lack the power to make
their own law concerning some less extreme alternative.108 The pur-
pose of their proposed rule was to ensure that every child had a
substantial and uninterruptible psychological relationship with at
least one parent. 0 9 The book is highly critical of the fact that under
existing law custodial arrangements have no finality; they can be
relitigated easily in the future. One advantage the authors would see
in their rule, no doubt, would be that it would avoid courtroom dis-
putes in the future by making it clear that the custodial parent had
all the bargaining chips.
But the authors entirely fail to consider the possible effects of such
a rule on the ability of parents to reach an initial agreement con-
cerning custody. The parents are allowed to agree only on that out-
come about which they are least likely to agree: total legal custody
or none. Because parents would lack the power to make binding
promises concerning any intermediate allocation, this rule would be
likely to create more custody disputes at the time of divorce. It might
also have unanticipated effects on support payments by the noncus-
todial parent.
Suppose, for example, that a father's initial preference is that custody
essentially be given to the mother, but with substantial paternal vis-
itation rights-two days every weekend and six weeks in the summer.
If he were to choose, however, between having exclusive custody
107. Id. at 38 n.*.
108. A more forceful argument against the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit proposal, sug-
gested by Strauss & Strauss, supra note 102, is that it violates the authors' own value
preference for minimum governmental intrusion on parental rights to raise their children,
see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrT, supra note 66, at 7-8. The effect of the visitation
proposal would be to make one parent a legal "stranger to his child" (though not without
obligations) without a finding of abuse or neglect. Strauss & Strauss, supra note 102, at
1002.
109. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 66, at 6, 37-38.
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himself or having no visitation rights whatsoever, he would prefer
exclusive custody. Such preferences not only seem plausible, but per-
haps even common. What would such a father do under the Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit scheme? An agreement that the mother would
be "the custodial parent" would mean that the father's power to main-
tain a relationship with his children was entirely within her discre-
tion, at least while the children were young. He would have no legal
recourse if she ever refused to permit visitation.
Even assuming that the mother were willing to promise the father
the visitation rights he wants, she would have no power whatsoever
to bind herself legally to that agreement. The father might therefore
realistically fear that she would exclude him at some time in the
future-perhaps if she remarried-no matter what she promises now.
To avoid that risk the father might reluctantly prefer a custody dis-
pute in court, in which he at least has a chance of winning, to a
settlement that gives him no legal right to see his children."10 No-
where do the authors consider this possible consequence.
Nor do they consider the effects of their visitation proposal on
support issues. Because the mother cannot bind herself concerning
visitation, she may decide to accept less support money, provided
the father does not contest custody. More generally, if visitation rights
are granted at the whim of the custodial parent, the noncustodial
parent may be less willing to commit himself concerning alimony
and child support."' By excluding the possibility of binding visitation
agreements, the proposal may also inhibit arrangements that tie fi-
nancial aspects to visitation in ways mutually desirable to the par-
ents. If all of these consequences were considered, one might easily
conclude that the risks that the visitation rule would create-more
custody disputes at the time of divorce and more support disputes
after divorce-outweigh the possible benefits of a reduction in visi-
tation disputes after divorce.
This analysis of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit rule illustrates
a point of more general importance: limitations on the parties' power
to make legally enforceable promises may, in some cases, make dis-
pute settlement more difficult. Professor Schelling has pointed out
the importance for bargaining of being able to make a binding
promise: "This need for promises is more than incidental; it has
110. This would mean not only an increase in litigated cases, but also an increase in
custody claims that are disingenuous. In the hypothetical example, the father might ask
the court for full custody only so that he could then cede much of the child-time back to
his wife without having to worry about trusting his former spouse.
111. See pp. 963-66 supra (inextricable link between child support and visitation).
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an institutional importance of its own. It is not always easy to make
a con-vincing, self-binding, promise."1 1
2
One important function of the legal system is to provide an effec-
tive mechanism for redress if a promise is broken. Of course, the
parties may still make promises even when they know in advance
that there can be no court enforcement: they may simply trust each
other, or they may view the risk of breach as so slight as to be un-
important. A promise may be effective because each party has pledged
his or her reputation. Or, the parties may be able to persuade each
other that, quite apart from what a court may do, the embarrassment
of reneging will be sufficient to make a breach very costly. In many
circumstances, because the parties each value their future relationship
-and because there may be informal means of retaliation to punish
a breach-court enforcement may not be decisive. Nevertheless, the
inability to make an enforceable promise may inhibit dispute set-
tlement.
This principle has application elsewhere in family law, as well as
in other legal contexts. It points to a possible consequence of the
legal rule permitting child support and custody to be reopened at
any time. The rule prevents the parents from binding themselves
permanently on custody and child support. The justification for the
limitation is obvious: because people's lives change, an arrangement
that benefits the child at one stage may not benefit the child at some
later stage. There is reluctance to give parents the power to make
permanently binding commitments that, in some cases, may later
prove inimical to the child's interests. Nevertheless, this inability to
make binding commitments may, as the criticism of the Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit proposal suggests, make dispute settlement through
negotiation more difficult. Legal standards that permit modification
only if there is a "substantial change in circumstances '"" 3 can be
seen as something of a compromise. They do not permit the parties
to make permanent commitments, but instead make agreements very
difficult, though not impossible," 4 to reopen unilaterally.
112. Schelling, supra note 55, at 335.
113. J. AREEN, supra note 43, at 579; see Foster &- Freed, Child Custody (pt. 2), 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 615, 623 (1964); Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 657 (1975).
114. How much of a compromise current modification standards represent will vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to how high a barrier the legal standard poses.
Compare Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 346-50, 374 A.2d 1040, 1042-43 (1977) (require-
ment of material change of circumstances must be balanced against best interests standard
and is one element in larger question of what is in child's best interests) with Perreault
v. Cook, 114 N.H. 440, 443, 322 A.2d 610, 612 (1974) ("The relationship established by the
custody award should not be disturbed unless the moving party demonstrates that the
circumstances affecting the [child's] welfare . . . have been so greatly altered that there
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C. Lawyers in the Dispute Settlement Process
Private ordering suggests new perspectives on the role of lawyers
in divorce. It also provides a fresh view of the question of whether
counsel should be appointed for the child.
1. The Roles of Lawyers
Lawyers perform a number of functions in the divorce process:
a. Source of information. Lawyers can provide the basic informa-
tion about each spouse's bargaining endowment-the applicable legal
norms and the probable outcome in court if the case is litigated.
Indeed, as noted earlier, imprecision in the applicable legal standards
increases one's need for legal advice. A rational client will want an
accurate assessment of the possible costs of alternative modes of
dispute settlement. Lawyers are also an important source of infor-
mation about transaction costs, a major element of which will be
legal fees." 5
b. Counselor. The lawyer may help the parties determine what
their real interests are. Divorcing spouses may not have carefully
examined the financial questions or their own preferences for child-
rearing responsibilities.
c. Clerk. To secure a divorce, even when there is no dispute, it is
typically necessary for certain legal procedures to be followed and
for various forms to be completed. To the extent the forms and the
procedures are intricate, divorcing couples may require legal assistance
even though there is no dispute whatsoever. 116
d. Negotiator. Lawyers can serve as negotiators with the other
spouse or the other spouse's lawyer. Some parties may find negotia-
tion extremely difficult, particularly given the anger and sense of
guilt that often accompany divorce. Negotiators can be hired in the
marketplace for legal services.
117
is a strong possibility the child will be harmed if he continues to live under the present
arrangement.") The standards will also vary in the time limits, if any, that are imposed.
Compare UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 409(a) (enacted in five jurisdictions) (no
motion to modify custody may be made earlier than two years after date of initial decree)
with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56(a) (1979) (court may modify custody order "at any time").
115. Other transaction costs of litigating are those imposed by the legal system-e.g.,
filing fees, court fees, etc. A lawyer will also be a source of information on the available
strategies for inflicting emotional costs on the other party.
116. See Pro Se Divorce, supra note 26, at 123-29.
117. See R. NVEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION 263-66 (1975); Pro Se Divorce, supra note 26,
at 141-43; cf. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAVWYERS AND THEIR WORK 81 (1967) ("[o]ne of
the most common lawyer tasks is negotiation"); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 661-62 (role
of "affiliates," who may be lawyers, in negotiation).
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e. Litigator. When there is a dispute that must go to court, the
lawyer has responsibility for marshaling and presenting relevant evi-
dence and making the necessary legal arguments.
2. Evaluating the Lawyer's Role
If one accepts the proposition that the primary function of the
legal system should be to facilitate private ordering and dispute reso-
lution, then several important questions come into sharp focus. To
what extent does the participation of lawyers facilitate dispute reso-
lution? Are there fairer and less costly procedures in which lawyers
would play a lesser role?
Many observers are very critical of the way some lawyers behave
in divorce negotiations. Lawyers may make negotiations more ad-
versarial and painful, and thereby make it more difficult and costly
for the spouses to reach agreement. 118
Indeed, lawyers may be more likely than lay people to adopt ne-
gotiating strategies involving threats and the strategic misrepresen-
tation of their clients' true preferences in the hope of reaching a
more favorable settlement for the client. Ivan Illich has suggested
that a broad range of illnesses are "iatrogenic": induced and created
by medical treatment and the health industry.1 9 The same charge
might be made against the legal profession. The participation of law-
yers in the divorce process may on balance lead to more disputes and
higher costs without improving the fairness of outcomes.
Yet, there are also arguments that lawyers facilitate dispute settle-
ment. Lawyers may make negotiations more rational, minimize the
number of disputes, discover outcomes preferable to both parties,
increase the opportunities for resolution out of court, and ensure
that the outcomes reflect the applicable legal norms. Professor Eisen-
118. See, e.g., R. EISLER, DISSOLUTION 40 (1977) ("legal system of battle where two ad-
versaries try to get the 'best possible deal' for their clients only tends to exaggerate, rather
than resolve, the emotional tensions of a divorce"); M. VANTON, MARRIAGE-GROUNDS FOR
DIVORCE 99-100 (1977) (accusing divorce lawyers of inflaming antagonisms, prolonging
negotiations, and doing nothing to attempt to save the marriage-all in order to obtain
large fees); cf. Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAMr. L. 7, 9, 11-20 (1965) (stressing
counseling role of lawyer and suggesting that lawyers develop interviewing skills grounded
in awareness of dynamics of situation). But see R. FELDER, DIvoRcE 1-2 (1971) (member
of divorce bar defending hired-gun approach: reason for which lawyer is hired is to "do
anything and everything . . . necessary . . . to gain [client] a divorce in which he will
come out financially, psychologically-in every way-on top"). A more positive appraisal
can be found in M. HUNT, supra note 3, at 219-21, which suggests that, although the
legal process is not designed to be a therapeutic mechanism, it generally does have somc
therapeutic aspects-e.g., some "people purge themselves of crippling feelings by the
haggling process," id. at 220.
119. I. ILLIC, MEDICAL NEMESIS 21-25 (1975).
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berg has suggested that a pair of lawyers-each acting for his client-
may make the process of negotiation very much like adjudication,
in which "rules, precedents, and reasoned elaboration . . .may be
expected to determine outcomes."'120 When each disputant is repre-
sented, the lawyers
are likely to find themselves allied with each other as well as
with the disputants, because of their relative emotional detach-
ment, their interest in resolving the dispute, and, in some cases,
their shared professional values. Each ... therefore tends to take on
a Janus-like role, facing the other as an advocate of his principal,
and facing his principal as an advocate of that which is reason-
able in the other's position.
.... Because a lawyer is both a personal advisor and a technical
expert, each actor-disputant is likely to accept a settlement his
lawyer recommends.
1 2 1
In view of the critical role of lawyers and the disparate functions
they may perform, it is startling how little we know about how
lawyers actually behave. Obviously, lawyers are not all the same.
Their styles and talents differ. Some lawyers are known within the
profession as negotiators who strive to find middle ground accept-
able to both sides; others are fighters who love the courtroom battle.
Research could usefully explore how much specialization there is
and, more importantly, the extent to which clients, when they are
choosing a lawyer at the time of divorce, have any notion at all of
their lawyers' skills or preferences for these various roles. More gen-
erally, systematic empirical research might illustrate how often, and
in what circumstances, lawyers facilitate dispute settlement at the
time of divorce, and how often, and in what circumstances, they
hinder it.
This framework also suggests how timely it is to reexamine the
question of why the legal profession should have a monopoly on
these roles and the extent to which it does have such a monopoly.
How well are lawyers trained to perform these various roles? Other
professionals or paraprofessionals might serve some of these functions
as well as lawyers at a substantially lower cost. This is most obviously
the case when there is no dispute, and the attorney's role is essentially
that of a clerk.
A recent study in Connecticut suggests that in most uncontested
divorces, clients believe their lawyer has done no more than fill out
120. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 638.
121. Id. at 664 (footnotes omitted).
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the necessary forms (a complaint, a claim for a hearing, and a decree)
and make an appearance at a pro forma hearing. 122 Moreover, the
same study suggests that because the forms and procedures are com-
plicated, do-it-yourself "divorce dissolution kits" do not, without ad-
ditional lay assistance, pose much of a threat to the monopoly of the
organized bar.12 3 Most people lack the time, confidence, or ability
to navigate through the legal shoals themselves, even when they have
no dispute with their spouse. This suggests that reform aimed at
simplifying the procedures for uncontested divorce could substan-
tially reduce transaction costs in many cases.1
24
D. Counsel for the Child
Numerous articles have advocated the appointment of counsel for
children. 25 Most of the literature has focused on the difficulties of
role definition for an attorney in court when his client may not be
mature enough to define his own interests. 2 6 A bargaining perspec-
tive suggests a somewhat different set of questions: how does the
appointment of counsel for the children affect the bargaining process
and its outcome? Does an attorney for the children facilitate dispute
resolution between the parents or make it more difficult? How are
transaction costs affected?
A recent student Note sheds some light on these issues.' 27 Based
on interviews with Connecticut attorneys who represented children
in custody suits, it suggests that the child's attorney performs an
important function as a mediator by helping the parents and their
attorneys to define their positions and reach an out-of-court agree-
ment. 128 Moreover, in negotiating an agreement, a child's attorney
122. Pro Se Divorce, supra note 26, at 154, 156.
123. See id. at 163.
124. Procedural simplifications could take many forms. An extension of pro se oppor-
tunities could be accomplished by a simplification of divorce forms and procedures accom-
panied by a clear legislative mandate permitting lay assistance without harassment by the
organized bar on grounds of unauthorized practice. See id. at 165. Uncontested divorces
could be handled entirely by an administrative agency. The registrar system in Britain
seems headed in this direction. See Registrars Study, supra note 16. A less drastic remedy
suggested by Professor Geoffrey Hazard, which would reduce the number of lawyers in-
volved rather than eliminate the lawyerly role altogether, would involve a more per-
missive attitude toward potential conflicts of interest. Hazard would allow a lawyer ap-
proached by divorcing spouses to act as "lawyer for the situation" to help them reach a
fair settlement, rather than refusing joint representation because of the fear of later
charges of conflict of interests. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978).
125. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 27. at 1127 n.7 (citing sources).
126. See id. at 1166 & n.194.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1173-75.
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introduces and focuses discussion on the child's perspective. 12 9 This
view of the child's representative seems plausible and serves as an
important counterargument to fears that introducing an attorney for
the child will necessarily increase contentiousness. 130
But the Note leaves unanswered critical questions concerning costs
and generalizability. In the Connecticut cities studied, counsel for
the child apparently were appointed in only a small number of dis-
puted cases in which a judge exercised discretion.' 3 ' These cases rep-
resented only a minuscule fraction of the total number of divorces
involving children. 32 Moreover, the Note does not indicate how trans-
action costs were affected by the appointment of counsel.1
3
Even if one accepts the proposition that in disputed cases that
would otherwise require adjudication, counsel for the child facili-
tates dispute resolution, this does not necessarily mean that this at-
torney would facilitate the process or be worth the costs in -a broader
cross-section of cases. Suppose, for example, that counsel for the child
were appointed in all cases. 134 Obviously the additional attorneys' fees
might be substantial. Moreover, what would be the effect on nego-
tiations between the parents in cases in which a court is not now
called on to resolve any disputed issues? It might well be that counsel
for the child could play a useful role in negotiations in some of these
cases. But it is certainly possible that in many, the process of nego-
tiation would be made much more complicated and costly, and that
the outcomes would not be improved from the child's perspective.
129. See id. at 1174.
130. See id. at 1172 & n.225 (citing sources).
131. The Note interviewed attorneys who represented children in approximately 35
cases during a three-year period. See id. at 1178 n.250.
132. During the three-year period when counsel for the child was appointed in 35
cases, we estimate there were 8,000-10,000 divorces involving children in the two Connecti-
cut counties studied. The total number of divorces filed in the Hartford and New Haven
Superior Courts in the fiscal year 1977-78 was 7,178. Telephone Interview with Gregory
Pac, Statistical Analyst, Office of the Chief Court Administrator, Judicial Department
of Connecticut (Mar. 29, 1979). If Connecticut follows the national average, approximately
half of those divorces involved minor children.
133. The attorneys interviewed tended to be young and all billed and received less for
their representation of children than would be normal for their practices. Lawyering for
the Child, supra note 27, at 1144 n.81. One wonders whether, if attorneys handled more
of these cases, they could afford to be so magnanimous. Moreover, it would probably be
necessary to bring fees more in line with standard legal practice in order to attract the
number of attorneys necessary to handle the increased load of a broader cross-section of
custody cases.
134. For a short time, Connecticut required the appointment of an attorney for the
child in uncontested cases. This was soon seen to be impractical and counterproductive.
See Berdon, A Child's Right to Counsel in a Contested Custody Proceeding Resulting
from a Termination of the Marriage, 50 CONN. B.J. 150, 155 n.19 (1976). Moreover, counsel
for the child has been suggested for undisputed cases. See, e.g., Note, A Child's Due
Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsTINGs L.J. 917, 948 (1976).
989
The Yale Law Journal
Research relating to negotiations in other contexts suggests that agree-
ment may be more difficult to reach when it involves more than
two parties.
135
A critical policy question concerns the formulation of criteria for
deciding when, and whether, the advantages of counsel for the child
outweigh the disadvantages. If counsel is only to be appointed in
"disputed cases," operational criteria for identifying such cases must
be defined. Some cases-e.g., those in which the parents agree from
the outset-are clearly undisputed, while others-in which parents
have invoked the court's jurisdiction to resolve a custody issue-are
clearly disputed. But there may be many cases in which the parents
initially disagree, but later reach a negotiated resolution. When, if
at all, should counsel for the child be appointed in these cases?' 36
There is little data to inform this more refined inquiry. Pilot projects
involving careful analysis of the consequences and costs of counsel
for the child in a broader cross-section of cases might shed useful
light on this important policy question.
E. The Role of Courts
Because divorce has become so widespread in this country, it is
probably the most common occasion for ordinary citizens to interact
with courts and the legal system. These contacts, to the extent they
seem superfluous and unduly unpleasant, may contribute to public
cynicism about law and its processes. Consideration of the issue from
135. In general, expansion of the number of parties directly involved in a bargain-
ing relationship increases the difficulty of co-ordination and introduces a variety of
problems, stemming primarily from the conflicting interests and interdependencies
among the parties involved .... Typical of the problems that arise when more than
two parties are involved in bargaining exchanges are the need for increased time to
reach agreements, an increase in the number of both tangible and intangible issues
that may arise, accountability to a greater number of salient audiences, and ten-
dencies to form coalitions.
J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS 64 (1975).
136. The Connecticut study identified a disturbing aspect of the appointment of
counsel for the child. Since appointment there, as in most states, is discretionary, see
Lawyering for the Child, supra note 27, at 1127 n.8, 1142 n.74 (citing statutes), requesting
the appointment of an attorney for the child becomes part of a party strategy of delay or
evasion. The judge often will not appoint an attorney until one of the parties makes a
motion, id. at 1185, the motion will often not be made until late in the litigation, and it
will often be made for purely strategic reasons by a party who feels he has nothing to
lose by getting another opinion, see id. A clear rule calling for appointment of an at-
torney in all cases would have the advantage of removing the appointment from the
strategic consideration of the parties. It might also enhance the opportunity for the in-
tervening attorney to play a mediator's role, see id. at 1187, but it could have the possible
disadvantages suggested in text.
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our perspective of private ordering highlights the need for general
reform and gives specific support to the oft-asserted desirability of
removing undisputed divorce cases from court dockets.131
Obviously, the state should provide some mechanism for dispute
settlement when the parties have not been able to agree. Having
courts adjudicate disputed cases is certainly one plausible way to
do this, although alternatives are possible. 38 A striking feature of
the present system, however, is the requirement that undisputed cases
also pass through court. Every state requires a court proceeding as part
of the divorce process, with a narrow exception in California. 3 9
This requirement is understandable from a historical perspective:
it represented a regulatory mechanism to ensure that divorces were
only granted in narrowly defined circumstances. Before the no-fault
revolution, dispute settlement was not the primary function of divorce
proceedings.
The no-fault revolution has now empowered either spouse uni-
laterally to create the circumstances for divorce. Ironically, however,
the shell of the same administrative and regulatory mechanism has
been preserved. This regulatory mechanism comes at a high price.
The requirement of a judicial proceeding probably imposes signifi-
cant transaction costs, both public and private. Parties find it nec-
essary to hire a lawyer, even in uncontested cases in which the law-
yer's function is basically that of a clerk. An appearance by a lawyer
in court takes time, for which the parties are charged. Moreover, a
judicial proceeding requires the use of judicial resources as well as
the time of the parties themselves. Indeed, undisputed divorce cases
137. See Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 286 (1933);
Pro Se Divorce, supra note 26, at 165-66; Note, Untying the Knot: The Cause and Patterns
of Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 649, 666-67 (1972).
138. The alternatives include mediation, see Mnookin, supra note 24, at 287-88, and
other less formal means of adjudication, id. at 289; see Coulson, Family Arbitration-An
Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAm. L.Q. 22 (1969).
139. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4550-4556 (West Supp. 1979). This provision allows summary
dissolution in uncontested divorce only if (I) there are no minor children, (2) the mar-
riage is of not more than two years' duration when the petition is filed, (3) neither party
owns any real estate, (4) neither party has unpaid debts of more than $2000, excluding any
car loan, (5) there is no community property (excluding a car) of more than $5000, (6)
neither spouse has separate property of more than $5000, and (7) spousal support is
waived. Id. § 4550. At any time after six months from the filing of the joint petition for
summary dissolution, the court may, at the request of either party, enter final judgment
dissolving the marriage. Id. § 4553. Because of these severe limitations, only a tiny pro-
portion of divorcing couples in California will qualify for this new summary procedure.
Indeed, it would appear that the divorce bar was entirely successful in limiting the pro-
cedure to cases in which there would have been no potential in any event for a significant
legal fee.
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clog the family law court system and exact a heavy toll on divorcing
spouses in the form of delay.'
40
The requirement of a judicial proceeding in undisputed divorce
cases could easily be eliminated. Getting married does not require
judicial proceedings, so why should getting a divorce? Some countries
have eliminated the requirement that undisputed divorces go through
court, 141 and it therefore seems appropriate to examine the possible
justifications for the requirement.
142
1. Ceremonial Function
A judicial proceeding may serve a ceremonial function that re-
confirms, both for the divorcing parties and the general public, the
seriousness with which the state treats marriage and divorce. Rituals
are important, and the court proceeding can be seen as a socially
imposed divorce ritual. One may, however, ask how well the existing
requirement serves the ceremonial function. The marriage ceremony
is an important social ritual, but it can be extremely simple, and it
does not require lawyers and a judge. Moreover, in most states the
parties to a divorce are not usually required to appear in court, but
may simply appear through their lawyers. If the ritual were for the
benefit of the parties, presumably their presence would be required.
Thus, the requirement is more like a civil fine imposed on a divorcing
couple-a fine payable not to the treasury but to the divorce bar.1
43
140. An analogous problem from a negotiation perspective is the existence of significant
differences in waiting periods according to whether the divorce is consensual or not. These
differences may be created by statute, see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1978)
(party abandoned may be granted divorce after 12 months; either party may obtain
divorce after separation for three years), or by problems of court administration and
docketing, see note 28 supra (in some jurisdictions, uncontested matters come to court
swiftly, but contested cases usually must wait over one year).
141. See Pro Se Divorce, suPra note 26, at 166 (registration coupled with waiting period
implemented in uncontested divorces in Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden).
142. The analysis that follows criticizes only the requirement that uncontested cases
be processed through courts. It is not meant to deny the importance of divorce as a legal
event in even the simplest and most amicable case. Eliminating the involvement of judges
does not necessarily mean eliminating the involvement of one or more lawyers. Divorce
severs some legal obligations and creates others-appropriate legal instruments must often
be drawn. It would seem advisable for all divorcing couples, even the most amicable, to
consult with someone on the legal consequences of divorce. Nevertheless, this does not
suggest that judicial involvement is also necessary. After all, most legal obligations we
agree to in life do not require a judge's approval.
143. Albert Hirschman has suggested that
[s]pecific institutional barriers to exit can often be justified on the ground that they
serve to stimulate voice in deteriorating, yet recuperable organizations which would
be prematurely destroyed through free exit. This seems the most valid, though often
not directly intended, reason for the complication of divorce procedures and for the
expenditure of time, money, and nerves that they necessitate.
A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 79 (1970).
The argument that making divorce easier might lead to the termination of salvageable
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2. Review Ensures Fair Outcomes: Fairness Between the Spouses
in Outcomes
The requirement of judicial approval of postmarital agreements
might be justified on the ground that the state has an interest in
ensuring that the results of the bargaining process are fair as between
the spouses. A judicial proceeding might protect people from their
own ignorance and might also be thought to prevent unfair results
arising from the unequal bargaining capacity of the spouses. These
arguments are sensible in the abstract, but the reality of the current
system suggests that they mean very little in practice. Courts typically
rubber stamp an agreement reached by the parties. Moreover, there
are reasons to doubt the necessity of judicial review of private agree-
ments for the purpose of preventing unfairness. There may well be
cases in which one spouse (stereotypically the husband) is highly
sophisticated in business matters, while the other spouse is an inno-
cent lamb being led to the slaughter. But married couples more
typically have similar educational and cultural backgrounds, and
most individuals perceive very well their own financial interests and
needs at the time of divorce.
If there remain legitimate fears that many spouses will be taken
advantage of through unequal bargaining, and a realistic hope that
judicial review of agreements can identify and remedy such cases,
then better means should be found to serve such a beneficial func-
tion. The problem with the current system is that all cases must
pass through the judicial net and that there are no standards or pro-
cedural mechanisms specifically designed to bring cases of unequal
bargaining to the judge's attention; the sheer quantity of cases that
a judge must oversee probably decreases the chances that he can pick
out and give appropriate attention to the right cases. A better system
would define, within a broad range, the norms that should govern
divorce agreements and use those norms to identify for intensive
judicial scrutiny the cases falling outside what is ordinarily thought
reasonable. Cases settled within the normal range would require no
prior review at all.
marriages was often invoked by those who unsuccessfully opposed the no-fault revolution.
The use of costly state-imposed procedures to inhibit divorce seems inconsistent with that
revolution; it might also offend, at least for the poor, the constitutional requirements of
due process. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). There is, of course, no
empirical evidence demonstrating that procedural simplification in uncontested cases
would substantially increase the number of "hasty" or "unwise" divorces. If this turned
out to be the case, and it was thought desirable to do something about it, then longer
waiting periods or even mandatory marriage counseling might be made preconditions of
divorce.
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3. Effects on Out-of-Court Settlements
It might be thought that the requirement that undisputed cases
go to court improves the private-settlement process outside of court.
If parties know that they will have to present their agreement to a
judge, they may deal with each other in a fairer way and may be
more likely to reach an agreement reflecting appropriate social norms.
Behavioral scientists have suggested that the presence of an "audi-
ence" can affect bargaining.144 In out-of-court negotiations, the judge
represents both an "actual" and an "abstract" audience. He is an
actual audience because parties know that eventually they may have
to explain their agreement to him, and this may mitigate extreme
claims. Indeed, the presence of the judiciary may sometimes exert
considerable pressure on the parties "to settle their own differences"
and thus avoid litigation. The judge, as a symbol of the social inter-
ests in the child and various notions of honor, reputation, and his-
tory, may represent an abstract audience as well.
It is extremely difficult to evaluate this argument in the specific
context of undisputed divorce cases. The knowledge that disputed
cases go before a court may be sufficient to bring the "audience"
benefits to the process of negotiation. It seems doubtful, however,
that the behavior of divorcing spouses in uncontested cases is dis-
cernibly affected by the symbolic (as contrasted with actual) pres-
ence of the judge during negotiations.
4. Child Protection
When a divorcing couple has minor children, the state has an ad-
ditional interest in child protection. The requirement of court review
of private agreements relating to custody and child support might
be justified on this ground: it may improve the quality of negoti-
ated agreements from the child's perspective. Some parents might
otherwise engage in divorce bargaining on the basis of preferences
that narrowly reflect selfish interests, rather than concern for the
child. The specter of review might serve as an important reminder
to the parents of the social concern for their children, and might
somehow constrain selfish behavior. Even a selfish spouse may be
more concerned about his reputation as a parent if there is some
sort of public process. Thus, in cases involving children, the judge's
role as "audience" is especially important. Finally, although most
parental agreements are approved after only superficial examination
144. See J. RuBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 135, at 43-54.
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by the judge, some agreements may in fact be disapproved. To the
extent courts succeed in identifying arrangements that are disadvan-
tageous to a child in a particular case and in imposing some better
alternative, judicial scrutiny serves a useful purpose.
The realism of these arguments, though, seems questionable. The
evidence we have suggests that in operation courts rarely overturn
parental agreements. Given the resources devoted to the task of scru-
tinizing agreements, 145 there is little reason to believe that the pfocess
operates as much of a safeguard when there is no parental dispute
to catch the judge's attention. Moreover, the process itself often im-
poses substantial transaction costs-both public (in terms of govern-
ment resources expended) and private (in terms of the cost to the
parties, the legal fees, and time). These extra transaction costs might
otherwise inure, at least in part, to the benefit of the children.
There are also reasons to think that, in the vast majority of cases,
judicial review is unnecessary. The custodial spouse will typically
perceive and attempt to influence the economic consequences for
the child of any support arrangement that he or she agrees to, since
there is considerable joint consumption between the custodial parent
and the child. 146 Moreover, most parents care deeply for their children.
No court proceeding can require parents to love their children, and
no judge can prevent selfish calculation by a divorcing parent. The
implicit attitude during the heyday of the fault-based system was that
there are good reasons not to trust parents with child-rearing decisions
following divorce. But is this attitude really appropriate today?
Consider, by comparison, the review requirements imposed by law
if the child's family is disrupted by the death of one parent. American
law permits a parent to disinherit his minor children. 4 7 A decedent
cannot, however, disinherit his spouse, and current law effectively
entrusts the surviving parent with child-rearing responsibility in the
light of existing economic resources. There is no ongoing supervision
of how a surviving spouse spends the inheritance, and there is no
examination of what portion is spent on the child. Instead, the sur-
145. See note 26 supra (study in Connecticut revealed that average of four minutes of
court time spent on uncontested divorces).
146. See p. 960 supra.
147. See R. MANooEKI, supra note 21, at 214-16.
There is, of course, substantial judicial supervision if money or property is left directly
to a child: typically there must be a guardian for the child's estate. The law requires
substantial constraints on the guardian's power to invest and spend the money, and
typically imposes considerable costs. Indeed, it is precisely for these reasons that a primary
goal in estate planning is to avoid guardianships, and instead use trusts if property is
intended for the benefit of minor children. See id. at 217-19.
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viving parent is trusted to look after the child-subject, of course,
to the minimum limitations applicable to all parents of the child
neglect laws. The same parental discretion seems appropriate if the
household is disrupted by divorce rather than death.
The requirement of judicial review in all divorce cases involving
children may, ironically, send inappropriate signals to parents at the
time of divorce: it may suggest to them that because of the divorce
they are no longer trusted to be adequate parents, and the state will
now assume on an ongoing basis special responsibility for their
children. Such signals are not only gratuitously insulting, but wrong:
the state does not and cannot assume broad child-rearing responsi-
bilities after divorce.
Conclusion
Viewing the process of divorce from the perspective of private or-
dering does not make previously intractable family law problems
disappear. If anything, the world seems even more complex, since
the analysis requires us to examine the effects of alternative rules
and procedures on informal and formal bargaining about which we
have little understanding. There now exists no bargaining theory
that can yield accurate predictions of the expected outcomes with
different legal rules, even when rational, self-interested parties are
only negotiating over money issues. Divorce bargaining is often con-
siderably more complex.
Given the absence of powerful theory or systematic data, this essay
makes no claims to being definitive. It instead suggests a theoretical
perspective that permits a broader analysis of the probable conse-
quences of family law rules and procedures. It also more sharply
exposes a set of questions of enormous social importance. If one
accepts the proposition that the role of the legal system in deter-
mining the consequences of divorce should reflect an emphasis on
dispute settlement, then the inadequacies of our current system are
readily apparent. The analysis does not imply that the state should
simply withdraw all resources from the process and leave it to the
divorcing spouses to work things out on their own, unassisted by any
professional help or legal protection. Instead, this inquiry should
emphasize the desirability of learning more about how alternative
procedural mechanisms might facilitate dispute resolution during a
typically difficult and painful time in the lives of parents and chil-
dren alike.
996
Vol. 88: 950, 1979
Divorce and Dispute Resolution
The perspective certainly has implications far broader than family
law. Individuals in a wide variety of contexts bargain in the shadow
of the law. Few automobile accident claims are ever tried; most are
settled out of court.148 Criminal prosecutions are typically resolved
by a plea bargain.'149 Most administrative proceedings result in con-
sent agreements rather than trials.'50 In each of these contexts, the
preferences of the parties, the entitlements created by law, transac-
tion costs, attitudes toward risk, and strategic behavior will substan-
tially affect the negotiated outcomes. Indeed, we hope this article
will stimulate and encourage further work by others in a variety of
contexts. Theoretical and empirical research concerning how people
bargain in the shadow of law should provide us with a richer under-
standing of how the legal system affects behavior, and should allow
a more realistic appraisal of the consequences of reform proposals.
148. See H. Ross, SETTLED OuT OF COURT 6-9 (1970).
149. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50,
50 (1968). For criticism of the plea-bargaining system, see, e.g., Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE Lj. 1179 (1975); Note, The Unconstitution-
ality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
150. See, e.g., G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 523 (1974)
("[m]ore than three-fourths of all complaints docketed by the FTC have historically
resulted in consent settlements").
